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Introduction	
 
There	are	a	variety	of	conceptual	frameworks	in	moral	philosophy	for	approach-
ing	concrete	ethical	issues.	This	includes	theories	of	value,	normative	theories,	and	
meta-ethical	 theories.	Concerning	normative	moral	 theories,	 a	major	ethical	 tradi-
tion	 is	 virtue	 ethics—the	 view	 that	 character	 and	 behavioral	 dispositions	 are	 of	
primary	 normative	 significance	 in	 ethical	 deliberation,	 and	 not	 particular	 actions.	
Typically,	philosophers	within	this	tradition	have	emphasized	the	necessity	of	moral	
education	and	character	cultivation.	Nevertheless,	there	are	a	variety	of	distinct	po-
sitions	 under	 the	 umbrella	 of	 ‘virtue	 ethics’	 that	 have	manifested	 in	 cultures	 that	
have	 not	 necessarily	 engaged	with	 each	 other.	Nonetheless,	 such	 cultures	 have	 in	
common	various	foundational	approaches	to	moral	virtue.	To	take	but	one	example:	
the	notable	emphasis	on	the	role	of	moral	exemplars	as	reliable	epistemic	guides	to	
ethical	behavior.	
One	of	these	traditions	is	the	Sufi	tradition	in	Islamic	thought.	Sufism	has	often	
been	interpreted	as	having	an	ethical	dimension	very	close	to	a	form	of	virtue	ethics	
(e.g.	Sherif,	 1975;	Bucar,	2014,	2018;	Attaran,	2015).	According	 to	 this	 interpreta-
tion,	moral	perfection	is	attainable	only	after	battling	with	and	overcoming	the	ego	
[Nafs].	This	view	holds	that	all	vice	is	rooted	in	the	ego,	thus	the	Sufi	tradition	offers	
a	unified	and	hierarchal	account	of	 the	nature	of	vice;	one	 that	 is	distinctive	 in	 its	
critical	attention	to	the	nature	and	influence	of	the	ego.	
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The	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	attempt	an	exegetical	work	within	the	Sufi	tradition	
about	 the	ego,	 expose	 and	critically	 examine	 such	 Sufi	principals	 and	 teachings	 in	
this	ethical	tradition	with	a	special	focus	on	the	ego,	and	to	draw	resemblances	be-
tween	Sufism	and	virtue	ethics.	The	main	objective	of	the	thesis	is	to	reveal	the	rich-
ness	of	the	Sufi	tradition	that	holds	exceptional	accounts	on	morality	and	egoism.	
The	 thesis	 contains	 three	main	 chapters.	 The	 first	 chapter	 is	 on	Virtue	 Ethics,	
where	 significant	 conceptual	 distinctions	 are	 presented	 concerning	 the	 ethical	
framework.	As	for	the	second	chapter,	it	is	dedicated	to	explore	the	world	of	Sufism	
and	closely	examine	the	ego	using	Abū	Ḥāmid	al-Ghazālī’s	(d.	505/1111)	magnum	
opus	 Iḥyā’	‘Ulūm	al-Dīn	(The	Revival	of	Religious	Sciences)	as	 the	primary	reference	
for	 this	work.	 Before	 the	 summarizing	 conclusion	 of	 the	 thesis,	 the	 third	 chapter	
navigates	first	from	the	exhaustive	focus	on	the	ego	towards	exploring	key	views	of	
morality	in	Sufism,	ending	the	chapter	with	identifying	the	common	links	between	
Sufism	and	virtue	ethics.		
There	are	 critical	 findings	 that	 gradually	 unfold	 throughout	 the	 thesis	 and	 are	
tightly	tied	to	previous	understandings	of	addressed	notions,	hence	I	encourage	the	
reader	not	to	advance	with	the	sections	unless	the	reader	is	sure	that	the	principle	
introduced	is	well	comprehended.	
Finally,	 it	 is	worthy	to	mention	that	 this	work	 intends	to	revive	the	primacy	of	
moral	 philosophy	 and	 proposes	 key	 routes	 that	 could	 lead	 humanity	 back	 to	 its	
goodness.	
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Chapter	1:	What	is	Virtue	Ethics?	
 
In	 this	 chapter	 I	 aim	 to	 identify	 the	essential	 features	of	Virtue	 Ethics	 so	 as	 to	
understand	how	it	is	to	be	distinguished	from	other	moral	theories,	Moreover,	I	aim	
to	explore	areas	of	tension	with	other	moral	theories.	
Virtue	Ethics	(VE)	 is	often	considered	to	be	a	 fundamental	 theory	in	normative	
ethics	that	is	traced	back	to	Plato	and	Aristotle	in	the	western	context	(Hursthouse	
and	Pettigrove,	2018).	In	VE,	moral	actions	are	not	based	on	duty	or	obligations	to	
do	a	certain	deed,	nor	does	the	agent	engage	in	moral	actions	out	of	consideration	of	
their	consequences,	aiming	to	maximize	well-being.	Instead,	a	moral	action	in	VE	is	
one	that	is	grounded	in	right	motivation,	intention	and	character:	right	actions	flow	
from	good,	stable	dispositions	(i.e.	virtues)	that	the	agent	was	successful	in	cultivat-
ing	within	their	character.	A	broad	definition	for	VE	is	to	look	at	it	as	a	coherent	ac-
count	of	virtues	that	are	desirable	and	attempt	to	classify	such	traits	and	highlight	
their	moral	worth.	As	for	moral	education,	it	would	be	the	matter	of	development	of	
such	 traits	 based	 on	 the	 virtue	 ethical	 theoretical	 framework	 (Carr	 and	 Steutel,	
1999,	p.	5).	
One	 thing	 that	 differentiates	 VE	 from	 deontology,	 aretaic	 from	 deontic,	 is	 the	
predicate	used	 to	express	a	moral	 judgment.	Aretaic	 judgments	would	 include	 the	
concepts	 good,	 bad,	 courageous,	 unkind,	 hostile,	 etc.	 while	 deontic	 judgments	 in-
volve	concepts	limited	to	right,	obligatory,	wrong,	forbidden,	which	reflects	the	na-
ture	of	the	parameters	of	each	moral	position.	The	ultimate	goal	of	human	life	on	an	
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Aristotelian	version	of	VE	is	eudaimonia;	flourishing,	which	could	be	attained	by	the	
attainment	 of	 moral	 virtue	 (Han,	 2015).	 This	 is	 one	 of	 the	 unique	 notions	 of	 VE,	
which	 differs	 to	 deontology	 or	 consequentialism	 in	 that	 they	 are	 only	 concerned	
with	presenting	a	framework	that	identifies	moral	good	actions	from	others.	Aristo-
tle,	however,	attempted	to	not	only	bring	a	worked	out	moral	framework	but	rather	
present	 it	 as	 an	 answer	 to	 man’s	 existence	 and	 purpose	 where	 man	 could	 bring	
harmony	and	meaning	to	his	life	by	pursuing	morality	and	the	attainment	of	virtue.	
It	is	worthwhile	to	note	that	Aristotle’s	version	of	happiness	is	one	that	is	not	indi-
vidualistic	but	rather	communal;	meaning	that	eudaimonia	is	not	reached	in	solitude	
but	rather	the	perfect	good	is	in	part	constituted	by	relations	to	one’s	family,	friends,	
and	fellow	citizens	as	man	is	a	social	being	(Aristotle,	1999,	Book	1,	VII	1097b,	10).	
The	virtuous	agent	isn’t	just	concerned	to	reaching	their	own	version	of	happiness;	
instead	the	virtuous	agent	recognizes	that	eudaimonia	is	the	whole	goal	of	the	com-
munity.	A	virtuous	agent	is	one	that	can	and	will	promote	goodness	and	happiness	
to	the	whole	community.	
Aristotle’s	emphasis	on	the	integral	role	that	communal	involvement	plays	in	at-
tainment	of	virtue	and	eudaimonia	cannot	be	neglected.	This	aspect	of	VE	is	particu-
larly	 appealing	 in	 contrast	 to	 competing	moral	 theories	 to	 it	 as	 it	 appeals	 to	 two	
types	of	people	 (1)	 those	who	are	 in	pursuit	of	holistic	and	existential	 truths,	 and	
how	they	link	that	with	morality	since	VE	offers	a	solution	for	leading	a	purposeful	
and	meaningful	 life	 that	 is	 in	pursuit	of	attaining	virtue	(2)	 those	who	are	not	 just	
rationally	driven	but	also	care	for	their	emotional	wellness	and	are	in	pursuit	of	liv-
ing	a	happy	life	that	is	in	accordance	with	morality.	
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It	is	also	worthwhile	to	note	that	the	move	from	hedonistic	to	eudaimonistic	ac-
counts	 of	 wellbeing	 is	 being	 considered	 in	 modern	 psychology,	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	
reach	more	valuable	happiness	and	abandon	pleasure	based	notions	presented	by	
positive	psychology	(Han,	2015,	p.	445).	According	to	Han,	 it	was	realized	that	the	
hedonistic	model	positive	psychologists	use	doesn’t	provide	 the	person	with	 long-
term	satisfaction	and	fulfillment,	hence	the	raise	of	 interest	 in	exploring	 the	 flour-
ishing-based	 moral	 philosophy	 brought	 by	 Aristotle	 that	 could	 potentially	 bring	
more	answers	on	wellness.	This	suggests	that,	with	the	increasing	interest	of	the	use	
of	the	eudaimonistic	approach	as	mentioned	by	Han,	it	could	be	noted	that	VE	pro-
vides	more	than	just	a	moral	theory	but	also	sort	of	a	guide	to	leading	a	prosperous	
life	and	achieving	psychological	wellbeing.	
An	 important	understanding	of	virtue	 is	 that	it	 is	a	state	or	disposition	(Greek:	
Hexis),	and	not	a	sort	of	mindless	habit	(Copp	and	Annas,	2006).	The	distinction	be-
tween	 habit	 and	 virtue	 is	 that	 a	 habit	 on	 its	 own	 has	 absolutely	 no	 active	 under-
standing	of	 the	reasons	 for	 the	action,	and	hence	has	no	moral	worth.	 In	 contrast,	
virtue	requires	an	involvement	of	the	agent’s	practical	reasoning,	as	it	will	shortly	be	
clarified	in	the	section	explaining	practical	wisdom1.	
A	virtue	is	also	defined	as	a	character	trait	that	is	desirable	and	worth	having,	the	
trait	could	be	considered	worthy	of	having	due	its	moral	worth	presented	in	the	eth-
ical	tradition.	This	excludes	skills	that	are	not	traits	of	the	character	yet	are	desira-
ble—e.g.	charm,	wit,	mathematical	acumen,	etc.	that	is	because	these	skills	have	no	
                                                
1	For	Aristotle	this	is	a	“hexis	meta	logou”	,	that	is	a	“habit	with	reason.”	
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moral	worth	but	are	rather	instrumental—	and	vices	that	are	not	worth	having	yet	
are	traits	of	the	character—e.g.	cowardice,	stinginess,	etc.	(Car,	1999,	p.	4).	
Although	Aristotle	is	considered	a	paradigmatic	proponent	of	virtue	ethics	(VE),	
it	is	important	to	note	that	VE	is	a	moral	theory	that	is	independent	from	one	partic-
ular	 philosopher,	 just	 as	 deontology	 is	 not	 exclusive	 to	 Kant;	 instead	 Aristotelian	
and	Kantian	contributions	or	views	belong	to	their	respective	moral	theories	rather	
than	define	them	(Swanton,	2015,	p.	20).	
Prohairesis,	which	might	translate	as	will	or	intention,	is	the	peculiar	mark	of	the	
virtuous	agent	(Chamberlain,	1984,	pp.	147-157).	Aristotle	divided	the	soul	into	two	
parts;	rational	and	irrational	(where	emotions	and	desires	lie).	The	agent	who	has	a	
weak	will—those	suffering	from	Akrasia—is	someone	who	is	considered	to	be	act-
ing	contrary	to	his	prohairesis;	as	prohairesis	is	understood	to	come	from	the	ration-
al	part.		
 
“Not	only	does	 the	 irrational	 soul	need	 the	help	of	 the	 rational	 soul,	but	 in	
turn,	 as	 the	 irrational	 soul	 becomes	more	 disciplined,	 it	 enables	 the	 other	
side	to	arrive	at	a	more	correct	account	of	the	mean.”	(Chamberlain,	1984,	p.	
147)		
 
This	theme	in	the	above	quote	is	common	with	the	Sufi	paradigm	and	is	consid-
ered	to	be	a	primary	role	in	understanding	and	dealing	with	the	ego,	as	it	will	later	
on	be	demonstrated.	Arthur	Schopenhauer	also	identified	the	limitations	of	defining	
Page 9 of 86 
an	action’s	moral	worth;	since	an	egoistic	motive	could	be	the	source	of	a	seemingly	
good	action	and	 it	 is	never	possible	 to	view	anything	except	 the	agent’s	 empirical	
deed	(Hassan,	2019,	p.	14).	
Non-Eudaemonistic	 versions	 of	 VE	 have	 been	 identified	 in	 the	 work	 of	 Hume	
(Slote,	2001);	Nietzsche	(Swanton,	2015);	Schopenhauer	(Hassan,	2019);	and	Con-
fucius	(Yu,	2007).	While	these	traditions	differ,	I	consider	VE	a	‘family	resemblance’	
theory	comprised	of	the	following	four	typical	key	features	that	I	would	like	to	iden-
tify	 for	 the	purpose	of	this	 thesis;	(1)	Practical	wisdom	(2)	Moral	exemplarism	(3)	
Moral	education	and	habituation	(4)	No	struggle	for	virtuous	actions.	
 
Practical	Wisdom		
Practical	wisdom,	phronesis,	is	what	allows	the	virtuous	agent	to	make	unerring	
moral	judgments	and	emotional	responses.	Frans	Svensson,	a	contemporary	virtue	
ethicist,	writes	of	phronesis	in	that:	
 
“It	provides	its	possessor	with	the	ability	to	see	things	as	they	really	are	and	
to	appreciate	the	salient	features	determining	what	would	constitute	the	ap-
propriate	thing	to	do	or	feel	in	particular	situations”	(Svensson,	2010,	p.	256)		
 
To	have	practical	wisdom	for	Aristotle	is	for	the	agent	to	have	the	ability	to	rec-
ognize	 opportunities	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 higher	 ends	 or	 value	 goals.	 Aristotle	 be-
lieves	that	one	cannot	be	morally	virtuous	without	having	practical	wisdom,	and	at	
the	same	time	one	cannot	have	practical	wisdom	without	becoming	morally	virtu-
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ous.	Hence,	Aristotle	emphasizes	the	unity	of	having	practical	wisdom	and	becoming	
morally	virtuous	(Aristotle,	1999,	Book	VI).	
 
Moral	Exemplars		
The	moral	exemplar	plays	an	important	role	in	VE	as	it	is	concerned	with	the	at-
tainment	 of	 virtues	 of	 the	 character;	 hence	 the	 learning	 primarily	 comes	 through	
encountering	and	learning	from,	and	attempting	to	emulate	moral	exemplars	whom	
were	able	to	embody	such	virtues	and	reach	practical	wisdom.	Moral	exemplars	act	
like	living	books	for	students	of	morality	to	read,	observe,	discover,	and	learn	from.	
As	the	guiding	reference	for	a	deontologist	could	be	the	text	that	holds	the	law	and	
breaks	down	its	analyses,	a	virtue	ethicist	would	have	the	moral	exemplar	as	 their	
reference	that	holds	and	embodies	the	virtues	that	are	sought.	
A	study	published	by	Anne	Colby	and	William	Damon	in	1992	under	the	name	of	
Some	Do	Care,	aimed	to	investigate	deeply	the	lives	and	work	of	23	moral	exemplars	
who	were	nominated	by	a	mix	of	ethicists,	moral	philosophers,	theologians,	and	so-
cial	 scientists	 (Moshman,	 1995).	 The	 study	 showed	 that	 each	 of	 them	 showed	 a	
long-term	 commitment	 and	 disposition	 to	 act	 upon	 moral	 principles.	 One	 of	 the	
most	profound	conclusions	 from	 that	 study	was	 that	 even	 though	 these	moral	 ex-
emplars	were	acting	consistently	with	their	moral	beliefs,	yet	they	denied	that	these	
actions	were	courageous	or	self-sacrificing.	The	authors	theoretical	interpretation	of	
this	is	that	is	not	because	they	reached	some	sort	of	an	advanced	stage	of	moral	de-
velopment,	but	 because	 it	 is	 a	matter	of	moral	 identity	 since	 these	 exemplars	 see	
themselves	in	moral	terms;	meaning	they	see	these	values	as	essential	to	who	they	
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are	and	what	they	need	to	do.	It	is	also	suggested	in	this	study	that	exemplars	show	
great	 empathy	 towards	 others	 as	 well	 as	 they	 tend	 to	 be	more	 affectionate	 than	
strict,	hinting	that	virtuous	agents	can	demonstrate	more	levels	of	compassion	and	
emotional	dealings	than	other	moral	figures	(Han,	2015,	p.	449).	
In	some	traditions,	the	moral	exemplars	have	active	roles	in	educating	their	stu-
dents	 to	 reach	moral	 excellence	 through	 engaging	 them	 in	 personalized	 activities	
that	will	help	them	attain	certain	virtues.	Moral	exemplars	are	not	 the	only	means	
towards	attaining	virtue,	but	they	are	primary,	which	means	that	their	role	in	moral	
education	is	primary	yet	it	is	not	impossible	to	learn	about	virtue	without	them.	One	
initial	objection	to	exemplarism	may	be	that	it	is	rare	or	even	impossible	to	find	this	
agent	or	exemplar	that	was	able	to	attain	virtue,	which	might	make	us	assume	that	it	
is	inadequate	to	consider	moral	exemplars	as	primary	sources	of	moral	education	as	
mentioned.	This	makes	us	briefly	recognize	the	opinions	regarding	the	unity	of	vir-
tue	 to	 demonstrate	 how	 the	 role	 of	 the	 exemplar	 could	 always	 be	 consistent	 and	
primary	in	attaining	virtue.	The	unity	of	virtue	could	be	read	in	two	different	ways:	
	
(a)	All	virtues	are	one,	the	agent	is	only	virtuous	when	he	is	in	mastery	of	
all	virtues,	or;	
(b)	The	 view	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 the	 agent	 to	 possess	 certain	 virtuous	
traits,	 even	 if	 they	 couldn’t	master	all	 virtues,	 and	 still	 be	 considered	
virtuous	in	respect	to	the	attained	ones.	
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In	both	cases	it	wouldn’t	affect	the	primary	role	the	moral	exemplar	plays	for	the	
following	reasons.	Firstly,	if	we	agree	on	the	latter	view,	then	it	is	possible	to	learn	
from	the	‘imperfect	exemplar’	only	specific	and	separate	virtues,	like	courage,	pa-
tience,	etc.	Secondly,	if	we	agree	on	the	first	view,	then	it	is	still	possible	to	even	per-
ceive	a	fictional	exemplar	(if	none	could	be	found	in	reality)	that	has	perfected	all	
virtues,	and	anticipate	through	thought	experiments	this	character’s	reactions	and	
dealings.	
 
Moral	Education		
This	leads	to	demonstrating	the	next	point	concerning	moral	education	and	ha-
bituation,	which	 plays	 an	 important	 theme	 in	 this	 thesis:	 VE	 typically	 emphasizes	
that	virtues	can	be	taught	and	developed,	especially	through	habituation	(Aristotle,	
1999,	Book	II).	In	the	hope	of	acquiring	a	virtue,	the	agent	could	repeat	certain	ac-
tions	that	will	 lead	them	to	cultivate	the	virtue	 itself.	As	 the	modern	phrase	has	it:	
“fake	it	till	you	make	it”.		
 
No	Struggle	
This	leads	to	the	forth	point	where	the	agent	reaches	the	juncture	of	having	no	
internal	struggles	when	encountering	situations	that	require	moral	judgments	and	
actions.	Virtue	demands	the	agent	not	to	have	an	internal	opposition	while	doing	the	
right	thing	for	the	right	reason	(Carr	and	Steutel,	1999).	An	agent	experiencing	signs	
of	 internal	 conflict	would	 not	 be	 considered	 to	 be	 genuinely	 virtuous,	 even	 if	 the	
moral	action	produced	was	aligned	with	the	agent’s	motivation.	This	should	not	be	a	
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problem	for	VE,	unlike	Kantian	moral	philosophy	that	emphasizes	that	 the	highest	
moral	actions	are	the	ones	that	go	against	 the	desires	 in	pursuit	of	doing	the	right	
thing,	since	the	case	in	VE	is	that	highest	moral	actions	flow	naturally	from	the	char-
acter.	If	 the	agent	 is	virtuous	then	he	desires	 the	right	 thing	and	he	knows	how	to	
reach	the	right	thing.	While	if	the	agent	exhibits	non-virtuous	temptations	or	desires	
even	if	he	did	not	act	upon	them,	they	would	be	signs	for	the	agent’s	incompletion	of	
virtue	attainment.	Such	 critical	 details	 and	 accounts	of	 the	 character	and	morality	
are	unique	 features	of	VE	and	Sufism,	which	not	only	suggest	 their	great	harmony	
but	 also	 show	 how	 these	 traditions	 distinctively	 bring	 their	 moral	 framework	 in	
ways	that	are	not	found	in	other	moral	theories.	
Nonetheless,	it	should	be	noted	that	some	ethicists	in	the	contemporary	second-
ary	 literature	have	questioned	 the	uniqueness	of	VE	as	a	normative	 theory.	There	
are	two	camps	that	give	different	verdicts	regarding	whether	to	consider	VE	a	third	
moral	framework,	distinct	from	consequentialism	on	the	one	hand,	and	deontology	
on	the	other,	as	 for	example,	G.E.M.	Anscombe	and	Jason	Kawall	argue	 for	 the	dis-
tinctiveness	of	VE.	On	the	other	hand	ethicists	like	Martha	Nussbaum,	believe	that	it	
is	 just	another	 form	of	expressing	consequentialism	or	deontology.	But	Anscombe,	
famously	 for	defending	and	reviving	VE	 in	 the	mid-twentieth	century,	not	only	re-
fused	 to	accept	 that	VE	 is	 a	way	 to	express	deontology,	 she	 further	argued	 that	 it	
was	not	possible	to	make	sense	of	deontology	as	a	moral	framework	independent	of	
its	 relation	 to	a	divine	command	 theory,	 i.e.	without	believing	 in	God,	highlighting	
that	duty	and	obligation	are	residuals	of	Christian	thought	(Anscombe,	1958,	p.	4).	
Kawall	criticizes	a	deontological	 argument	that	defines	a	virtue	as	a	mere	disposi-
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tion	to	perform	one’s	duty,	and	described	this	as	“reductive	deontologism”	(Kawall,	
2009,	p	4).	He	offers	an	example	of	the	actions	of	someone	who	is	in	love	who	will	
have	actions	 flowing	 from	 this	 emotional	 state.	 It	wouldn’t	be	sensible	 to	describe	
this	person	as	having	a	disposition	to	perform	certain	actions	or	follow	specific	set	
of	rules.	This	analogy	gives	us	a	better	way	to	understand	how	VE	could	be	easily	
interpreted	 and	 captures	 the	 hidden	 essence	 of	 this	 character	 centered	 theme,	
where	the	agent	is	acting	out	of	his	state	and	virtue	of	love	not	in	a	systematic	or	lin-
ear	fashion	but	rather	using	a	dynamic	and	improvised	approach.	Similarly,	an	agent	
who	possesses	a	virtue	of	honesty	will	genuinely	respond	and	react	out	of	this	virtue	
with	no	required	high	level	of	moral	reasoning.	The	agent	will	still	be	rationally	con-
scious	in	performing	such	moral	action,	since	practical	wisdom	is	an	essential	com-
ponent	of	a	virtuous	action,	nor	will	the	agent	be	experiencing	inner	struggle	when	
put	in	such	situation.	
Kawall	also	argued	that	there	are	some	actions	for	which	people	possess	various	
virtues	that	do	not	require	complex	reasoning.	For	example,	watching	a	puppy	being	
tortured	will	 be	 seen	 as	wrong	 immediately,	 and	 that	 is	 due	 to	 our	 possession	 of	
basic	compassion	and	justice.		
Moving	to	the	other	camp,	Nussbaum	denies	that	Kant’s	moral	philosophy	could	
be	understood	as	just	being	obsessed	with	duty	and	neglecting	character	formation	
and	 training	 of	 passions,	 and	 that	he	 offers	 detailed	 analyses	 of	 some	 virtues	 and	
vices	 (Nussbaum,	 1999,	 p.	 165).	 Nussabaum	 lists	 three	main	 claims	 that	 are	 pro-
moted	by	the	defenders	of	VE,	which	are:	
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“A.	 Moral	 philosophy	 should	 be	 concerned	with	 the	 agent,	 as	well	 as	with	
choice	and	action.		
B.	Moral	philosophy	 should	 therefore	 concern	 itself	with	motive	and	 inten-
tion,	 emotion	 and	 desire:	 in	 general,	with	 the	 character	 of	 the	 inner	moral	
life,	and	with	settled	patterns	of	motive,	emotion,	and	reasoning	that	lead	us	
to	call	someone	a	person	of	a	certain	sort	(courageous,	generous,	moderate,	
just,	etc.).		
C.	Moral	philosophy	should	focus	not	only	on	isolated	acts	of	choice,	but	also,	
and	more	importantly,	on	the	whole	course	of	the	agent's	moral	life,	its	pat-
terns	of	commitment,	conduct,	and	also	passion.”		
 
Nussabaum’s	point	is	that	Kant	and	mainstream	Utilitarian	thinkers	would	agree	
with	all	three	points,	suggesting	that	there	is	no	need	to	have	a	separate	third	moral	
theory	for	VE	when	it’s	all	covered	in	Kantian	and	Utilitarian	views.	There	are,	how-
ever,	several	shortcomings	of	such	an	argument.	The	first	is	that	Kant	brings	direct	
criticism	to	any	moral	framework	except	his	deontological	version,	clarifying	that	it	
is	 not	moral	 to	 act	 upon	 anything	 but	 duty,	 which	 is	 the	 reason	 based	 universal	
moral	law	(Kant,	1998).	Hence,	the	general	claim	that	Kant’s	moral	philosophy	could	
go	 hand	 in	 hand	with	 VE	 is	mistaken,	 according	 to	 Kant	 himself.	 	 Secondly,	 Kant	
wouldn’t	agree	on	point	A,	since	he	believes	that	the	moral	law	is	the	only	reference.	
Like	Utilitarians,	virtue	 is	only	valuable	 for	Kant	 instrumentally:	 it	ought	 to	be	de-
veloped	because	it	helps	us	do	our	duty.	This	is	out	of	step	with	traditional	VE,	since	
VE	holds	virtues	are	good	for	their	own	sake.	Thirdly,	Kant	also	wouldn’t	agree	with	
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point	B—that	mentions	that	emotion,	along	with	motivation	and	reason,	could	lead	
us	to	call	a	person	who	has	a	particular	virtue—because	he	clearly	states	that	emo-
tions	have	no	role	in	adding	moral	worth	to	an	action,	let	alone	it	being	the	case	that	
emotions	 cause	 a	person	 to	be	perceived	as	virtuous,	 and	 similarly	with	 the	 third	
point.	Fourth,	the	three	points	seem	to	be	a	hasty	attempt	to	summarize	what	VE	is	
and	what	virtue	ethicists	are	calling	for,	as	there	is	more	to	virtue	ethics	than	what	
Nussbaum	proposes,	as	we	shall	explore	in	the	chapters	to	follow.	
It	 is	more	plausible	 to	argue	that	deontology	as	a	theory	could	have	a	common	
ground	with	VE	than	to	claim	that	its	Kantian	variety	has	a	common	ground	with	VE,	
since	Kant	is	very	clear	about	his	views	regarding	the	inadequacy	of	all	other	moral	
theories	as	well	as	how	he	presents	his	contribution	as	the	only	unique	valid	option	
(Kant,	1998).	Therefore	it	would	have	been	more	sensible	if	the	claim	was	not	about	
Kantian	 views	 and	was	 about	 how	deontology	 in	 general	 can	work	with	VE.	 As	 a	
matter	of	fact,	as	the	paper	will	unfold,	it	will	show	that	Sufism	has	worked	out	this	
blend	between	deontology	and	VE	in	a	unique	manner.	
A	very	 important	 link	 is	 important	 to	disclose	 that	would	appropriately	bridge	
VE	and	Sufism	is	Asceticism.	We	can	work	with	a	general	understanding	of	Asceti-
cism,	which	involves	deliberate	actions	that	involve	self-denial	for	the	sake	of	culti-
vating	a	good	moral	character,	while	self-denial	means	resisting	and	not	submitting	
to	internal	struggles	that	incline	one	to	seek	sensual	pleasures	or	avoid	sensual	pain	
related	 experiences.	 	 Brian	Besong	 gave	 very	 focused	 efforts	 to	 demonstrate	 how	
asceticism	 is	 essential	 in	 VE	 as	 recognized	 by	 many	 philosophers	 as	 means	 for	
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reaching	virtue	(Besong,	2019).	He	also	used	empirical	research	to	draw	on	the	im-
portance	 of	 self-control	 as	 well	 as	 responded	 to	 criticisms	 of	 asceticism,	 one	 of	
which	 is	 that	 asceticism	 is	only	used	 for	religious	purposes.,	which	he	 claims	 isn’t	
quite	 the	case,	and	 that	 it	 is	considered	an	 integral	part	of	 acquiring	virtue.	There	
are	several	plausible	points	from	Besong	‘s	work	that	are	important	to	highlight	and	
digest	before	exploring	the	world	of	Sufism.	
Firstly,	 is	 that	 ancient	 philosophers	 like	 Plato,	 Aristotle,	 Pythagoras,	Diogenes,	
and	Seneca	all	were	referenced	to	support	the	understanding	that	deliberate	actions	
of	self-denial	are	important	in	the	pursuit	of	virtue	as	such	actions	will	allow	mas-
tery	over	oneself.	This	indicates	a	remarkable	commonality	with	the	main	theme	of	
this	 thesis	and	one	of	 the	 important	 themes	 in	Sufism,	which	also	proscribes	 con-
quering	one’s	 self	 in	order	 to	 reach	 virtue.	 Second	 is	 that	 there	are	 corporeal	 and	
incorporeal	 practices	of	 asceticism	 that	allow	 the	agent	 to	experience	more	 resili-
ence	in	submitting	to	pleasurable	or	irrational	desires	 that	stand	in	the	way	of	be-
coming	virtuous.	This	means	 that	what	asceticism	really	provides	 the	agent	 is	 the	
ability	 to	choose	according	to	the	agent’s	best	 judgment	 instead	of	acting	or	being	
affected	 by	 immoral	 or	 irrational	 desires.	Hence	 asceticism	 is	 not	 valuable	 for	 its	
own	sake,	but	only	morally	worthy	when	it	is	done	for	the	sake	of	reaching	virtue.	
Finally	an	important	note	that	will	be	elaborated	upon	later	in	more	detail,	one	that	
aligns	greatly	with	 the	 Sufi	paradigm	on	 the	 stages	of	 the	 self,	 is	 the	 focus	on	 the	
agent’s	experience	of	pain	as	a	result	of	being	pulled	in	opposing	directions	in	con-
texts	where	doing	what	is	pleasurable	and	doing	the	right	thing	are	contradictory.	
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With	this	being	added	to	the	big	picture	of	VE,	we	shall	now	explore	Sufism	as	to	
be	able	to	construct	a	bigger	picture	that	tells	us	how	both	traditions	come	together.	
 
	
Chapter	2:	Sufism		
 
In	 this	 chapter	we	will	 explore	 in	 depth	 the	 holistic	 Sufi	 paradigm	 concerning	
morality,	the	purification	of	the	Ego,	and	the	strategy	and	methodology	of	reaching	
the	Sufi	goal:	reaching	“union	with	God”,	as	in	the	words	of	William	Chittick	who	is	
an	 interpreter	of	 classic	 Islamic	philosophical	 and	mystical	 literature,	may	also	be	
expressed	as	“realization	of	human	perfection”	or	“actualization	of	the	divine	image	
in	which	human	beings	were	 created”	 (Chittick,	2008,	p.	20).	As	 it	will	be	demon-
strated	in	the	ending	of	the	chapter,	virtue	could	mean	one	of	two	things	1)	an	iso-
lated,	 individual	 disposition	 or	 specific	 virtue	 or	 2)	 the	whole	 or	 sum	of	 all	 these	
‘specific’	virtues—whole	virtue.	In	this	chapter,	and	for	the	purpose	of	better	navi-
gation	within	the	Sufi	context,	we	shall	use	the	word	virtue	to	mean	the	‘specific	vir-
tue’,	 and	 ‘Sufi	 virtue’	 to	mean	 the	whole	 complete	 virtue	 as	 per	 the	 Sufi	 point	 of	
view.	This	Sufi	virtue	is	referred	to	as	‘al-insān	al-kāmil’,	the	perfect	man,	in	Sufi	lit-
erature.	It	will	be	demonstrated	in	this	chapter	that	attaining	this	state	of	perfection	
requires	first	the	abandonment	of	vices,	then	the	fulfillment	of	virtues.		
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An	Overview	on	Sufism		
There	is	no	common	agreement	between	Islamic	scholars	on	what	the	word	Su-
fism	 originally	 meant	 or	 literally	 means	 but	 rather	 they	 have	 discussed	 different	
possible	 interpretations	 (Chittick,	 2008,	p.	 3).	 One	 of	 the	 proposed	 literal	 transla-
tions	of	Sufism	is	that	it	means	“one	who	wears	wool”,	which	referred	to	people	with	
ascetic	practices	that	led	them	to	wear	uncomfortable	clothes	as	part	of	their	inner	
combat	(jihād	al-nafs)	in	letting	go	of	worldly	pleasure	as	to	reach	higher	meanings,	
which	in	a	way	yet	to	be	specified,	does	capture	the	overall	spirit	of	the	tradition.	In	
this	section	I	intend	to	give	a	general	interpretational	analysis	of	Sufism	that	doesn’t	
aim	to	confine	Sufism	to	these	points	but	rather	to	help	understand	its	main	defining	
unified	elements	that	are	Theological,	Philosophical,	and	Spiritual.	
Sufism	is	an	Islamic	tradition	that	presupposes	Islamic	theology.	Its	main	goal	is	
achieving	union	with	Allah,	the	name	of	God	in	Islam,	through	actualizing	purifica-
tion	 from	one’s	 ego	and	detaching	 from	all	objects	except	Allah	 (Chittick,	2008,	p.	
20).	In	Sufism,	the	primary	guide	for	moral	beliefs	would	exist	within	the	scripture	
of	the	Quran	and	the	character	of	the	prophet	himself	as	an	exemplar.	There	is	also	
great	emphasis	on	scholars	and	saints	whom	have	inherited	Islamic	knowledge	that	
are	traced	all	back	to	the	prophet	in	what	is	called	as	silsila,	which	translates	as	the	
chain	 that	 verifies	 the	 authenticity	 of	 the	 transfer	 of	 knowledge	 through	 verified	
means	(Chittick,	2008,	p.	28).	This	knowledge	could	either	be	related	to	theological	
content	that	is	concerned	with	rational	and	law	based	sciences	known	as	Knowledge	
of	 Shari’a	 (‘ilm	al-sharī‘a),	 or	 spiritual	 knowledge,	 known	 as	Knowledge	of	 Reality	
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(‘ilm	al-ḥaqīqa)	 that	refers	 to	knowledge	of	God,	 that	could	be	transferred	through	
tarbiya,	moral	education	or	discipline	of	one’s	character	(Janssens,	2011,	p.	627).2	
This	brings	us	to	explaining	the	second	element,	which	is	the	Spiritual	one.	It	is	
what	 the	Sufi	 tradition	offers	 in	a	unique	way	as	an	eloquent	guide	 for	 those	who	
want	to	advance	in	the	spiritual	path	to	remove	the	barrier	and	obstacles	that	stand	
between	 the	murīd,	 the	 seeker	 of	 God,	 and	God.	 Al-Ghazālī’s	 testimonial	 in	 his	al-
Munqidh	min	al-Ḍalāl	(The	Deliverance	from	Error)	stated	that	he	acknowledged	that	
Sufis	 are	 people	 of	 taste	 (dhawq)	 and	 state	 (ḥāl),	 and	 not	people	 of	words	 (DFE).	
This	explains	a	traditional	understanding	in	Islamic	thought	that	conceptualizes	two	
approaches	towards	truth,	one	through	intellectual	discourse	and	other	through	ex-
perience	and	taste.	There	is	great	wealth	of	aesthetic	practices	in	the	Sufi	tradition	
that	helps	stimulate	the	dhawq	experience	through	Islamic	practices	primarily	done	
by	 hymn	 and	 mantra	 like	 remembrance	 (Dhikr)	 and	 contemplative	 reflective	
thought	activities	(Fikr)	(RRS).	The	Spiritual	domain	gives	comprehensive	theoreti-
cal	 and	 practical	 accounts	 on	 the	 ego;	 its	 ontology	 and	 how	 to	 reach	 purification	
from	it	along	with	other	vices	and	barriers.	The	removal	of	these	obstacles	and	veil	
are	necessary	for	a	person	to	reach	God.	A	typical	example	of	these	practices,	which	
have	an	ascetic	nature,	is	enduring	hunger	as	means	to	counter	greed	or	staying	in	
silence	as	to	cure	the	agent	from	cursing	or	backbiting	(Alavi,	2007,	p.	314).	
Fundamentally,	al-Ghazālī	explains	that	ascetic	practices	are	rooted	in	four	are-
as:	food,	sleep,	relationships,	and	speech,	suggesting	that	 isolation,	silence,	hunger,	
                                                
2	See	also:	A.	Al-Ḥasanī,	(2002),	p.	272	
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and	 vigil	 are	 core	 for	 the	 advancement	 of	 spiritual	 flourishing	 (RRS,	 p.	 120).	 al-
Ghazālī	 stated	 that	 Spiritual	 revelation	 is	 accounted	 as	 one	 of	 the	 epistemological	
means	of	acquiring	truth,	which	he	came	to	acknowledge	as	a	result	of	his	recovery	
from	a	two-month	period	of	skepticism:	
 
“And	 that	 [his	 recovery	 from	 skepticism]	was	not	 through	 a	 systematic	 ar-
gument	and	classification	of	words,	but	through	a	light	that	Allah	has	sent	in-
side	the	chest,	and	that	light	is	the	key	of	the	most/highest	of	knowledge,	so	
whoever	assumed	that	kashf	[intellectual	intuition]	is	limited	to	disclosed	ar-
guments,	he	has	limited/narrowed	Allah’s	vast	mercy,	and	when	the	prophet	
was	asked	about	sharh	[expansion]…	he	answered	it	is	a	light	that	is	sent	by	
Allah	 in	the	heart…	so	 it	is	from	this	light	 that	revelation	should	be	sought”	
(DFE	,	p.	30)	
 
It	 is	within	 this	Spiritual	domain	where	 the	beginning	 (done	with	 repentance)	
and	ending	of	the	murīd’s	journey	is	since	‘devotionally	seeking	Allah’	is	the	actual-
ization	of	man’s	purpose	as	mentioned	in	the	Quran	“And	I	have	not	created	the	jinn	
and	the	humans	except	to	worship	me”	Qur’an	[51:56].	
As	for	the	philosophical	domain,	it	is	argued	that	al-Ghazālī	was	inspired	by	Avi-
cenna,	who	was	known	to	be	influenced	by	western	classical	philosophical	transla-
tions	especially	of	Aristotle,	and	made	use	of	several	of	his	theories	and	views	(Trei-
ger,	2012).	Some	of	these	principles,	like	the	golden	mean,	which	will	be	explained	
later,	were	used	by	al-Ghazālī	to	articulate	Sufi	notions	and	give	concrete	analysis	of	
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morality.	 It	 is	however	 the	 case	 that	without	 the	other	 two	domains	 the	efforts	of	
reaching	virtue	would	be	insufficient	for	reaching	one’s	purpose,	as	being	‘virtuous’	
isn’t	the	end	goal	in	Sufism	as	the	whole	moral	worth	isn’t	found	in	merely	being	vir-
tuous	for	the	sake	of	anything	but	being	virtuous	for	the	sake	of	God	and	the	afterlife	
(RRS,	p.	79).	The	potential	value	presented	in	engaging	with	philosophy	in	the	Sufi	
tradition,	such	as	aesthetics	and	ethics,	is	that	it	holds	technical	and	practical	meth-
ods	and	theories	 that	could	be	used	 in	dissecting	the	relations	between	virtue	and	
its	 installment	 in	a	 character,	 as	 in	 the	 case	of	VE.	 It	 is	hence	useful	 to	deploy	 the	
studies	and	practices	 found	 in	VE	 in	 following	 the	divine	 teachings.	 I	would	argue	
that.	were	this	domain	not	part	of	the	Sufi	scheme,	there	would	be	less	articulation	
of	accounts,	principles,	and	theories	that	are	related	and	valuable	to	understanding	
virtue,	and	which	would	help	us	better	recognize	and	shape	a	moral	character.	
In	sum,	the	model	I	am	proposing	that	best	explains	Sufism	is	threefold:	Sufism	
is	founded	in	Islamic	theology,	which	is	considered	to	be	the	groundwork	of	the	Sufi	
tradition;	 it	 entails	 a	 portion	 of	 philosophy	 (mainly	 found	 in	 epistemology,	meta-
physics,	ontology,	aesthetics,	and	ethics);	and	it	actualizes	a	paradigm	of	spirituality	
that	holds	objective	experiences	with	the	world	of	the	unseen.	The	framework	could	
be	represented	in	this	manner:	
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The	model	doesn’t	suggest	that	the	Sufi	must	engage	in	high-level	philosophical	
discourse,	 in	 fact	 al-Ghazālī	 stated	 that	 the	 discipline	 of	 philosophy	 (mainly	 refer-
ring	to	metaphysics),	should	be	kept	away	from	the	masses	and	isn’t	worthy	of	pur-
suing	except	it	is	necessary	for	a	group	within	the	Islamic	community	who	should	be	
able	to	protect	and	respond	to	false	claims	that	could	disturb	the	faith	of	the	people,	
known	as	mutakallimun	(DFE,	p.	30).	Despite	of	al-Ghazālī’s	criticism	to	philosophy	
he	did	praise	the	study	of	logic	and	he	also	stated	that	any	Muslim	must	be	able	to	
intellectually	believe	 in	God’s	existence	and	to	assert	 that	with	certainty	even	with	
the	 simplest	 forms	 of	 arguments	 that	 are	 essentially	 deduced	 and	 analyzed	 from	
theological	 references	 (RRS:	 2,	 Ch.	 2).	 He	 even	 clarified	 that	 the	 layman’s	 faith	 is	
stronger	and	better	rooted	than	the	mutakallim,	the	specialized	rational	theologian	
who	 engage	 in	 argumentation	 regarding	 proofs	 of	 God’s	 existence	 and	 is	 easily	
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swayed	 between	 different	 proofs	 instead	 of	 experiencing	 truth	 in	 the	 plurality	 of	
ways	in	which	it	can	be	apprehended	especially	through	engaging	in	other	forms	of	
activities	like	the	ones	that	involve	ascetic	practice,	which	is	still	considered	as	en-
gagement	with	philosophy	of	ethics	in	this	case.	So	in	this	context	al-Ghazālī	is	not	
criticizing	philosophy	as	a	 sum,	but	 in	actual	 fact	he	 is	merely	exposing	how	pure	
rational	thought	is	insufficient	to	spiritual	flourishing,	although	the	consideration	of	
ethics	and	other	principles	found	in	philosophy	could	be	beneficial	to	one’s	spiritual	
path.	 Also	 al-Ghazālī’s	 main	 criticism	 to	 philosophy	 is	 directed	 at	 metaphysical	
views,	which	hold	non-theological	contradictory	assumptions	regarding	divine	reve-
lation	and	truths.	In	fact,	al-Ghazālī	claims	that	political	and	moral	philosophy	were	
inspired	by	wisdom	 found	 in	 teachings	of	 ancient	prophets	and	 saints	who	are	or	
alike	to	Sufis	that	were	consumed	with	ascetic	practices	to	pursue	closeness	to	Allah	
and	 held	 divine	 knowledge.	 Later	 the	 philosophers	 borrowed	 such	 concepts	 and	
fused	them	with	their	work	that	is	free	from	theological	assumptions	(DFE,	p.	49).	
Sufism	implicitly	involves	philosophy	because	in	order	to	take	theological	truths	
and	infer	their	consequences	for	ethics	and	apply	them	in	ethical	life,	one	must	use	
philosophy.	The	model	doesn’t	suggest	that	the	Sufi	need	to	study	classical	philoso-
phy	 in	 a	 traditional	manner,	 but	 rather	 suggests	 that	 the	 Sufi	 always	 holds	 philo-
sophical	 views	and	 insights	and	 has	 some	degree	of	 involvement	with	 philosophy	
(in	its	authentic	meaning	of	love	of	wisdom)	in	at	least	one	of	its	branches,	so	long	as	
they	are	aligned	with	the	ground	of	Islamic	theology.	 In	the	Sufi	tradition,	philoso-
phy	 in	the	sense	of	 ‘love	of	wisdom’,	 isn’t	at	all	divorced	from	religion,	 in	 fact	 it	 is	
core	in	the	spiritual	path	of	the	Sufi	to	involve	in	contemplative	and	reflective	think-
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ing	as	well	as	 to	explore	in	different	depths	the	secrets	of	morality,	aesthetics,	and	
Spiritual	 truths.	 Having	 love	 for	 wisdom	 in	 Sufism	 entails	 appreciation	 of	 divine	
knowledge	and	spiritual	truths,	an	attitude	that	is	important	in	the	advancement	of	
the	murīd	 in	his	quest	of	knowing	God	since	 ‘knowledge’	is	of	a	high	spiritual	rank	
(SA	 ,	 p.	 27).	 This	 hints	 to	 how	 the	 deontological	 account	 presented	 in	 the	 Islamic	
Shari’a	 can	 coincide	with	other	 accounts	 that	 are	 fixated	 on	 the	 flourishing	 of	 the	
soul.	
Al-Ghazālī	 gives	 a	 detailed	 account	 in	 the	 ‘Marvels	of	 the	Heart’	 book	 from	 the	
Iḥyā’,	on	the	ego	(RRS:	3);	 the	main	vices	of	man;	practices	and	treatments	 for	 the	
vices;	 as	well	 as	a	description	of	 the	 virtues.	 I	 shall	 now	 include	 the	main	 themes	
from	his	book	that	will	help	explore	in	detail	the	Sufi	paradigm.	
	
Examining	the	Heart		
It	is	important	to	first	understand	that	many	Sufis,	including	al-Ghazālī,	view	the	
ego,	 soul	 (rūḥ)	 (RRS:	 3),	heart	 (al-qalb),	 and	 intellect	 (al-‘aql)	 as	different	parts	of	
the	human	each	with	its	own	spiritual	counterpart	and	essence.	For	the	purposes	of	
this	 study	we	will	 examine	 deeply	 al-Ghazālī’s	 analyses	 on	 the	 heart	 and	 the	 ego.	
The	heart,	explained	by	al-Ghazālī	as	the	most	important	organ	by	first	referencing	
to	 physical	 heart	 not	 just	 because	 it	 is	 served	 by	 all	 other	 organs,	 but	 most	 im-
portantly	 because	 its	 spiritual	 counterpart	makes	 it	 the	 only	knower	 of	 Allah	 and	
receiver	 of	 divine	 revelation	 and	 knowledge.	 A	 view	 that	 could	 be	 considered	 in-
spired	 by	 Avicenna	 who	 mentioned	 the	 body	 to	 be	 an	 instrument	 of	 the	 soul	
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(Janssens,	2011,	p.	616).	The	heart	is	also	considered	to	be	the	most	important	part	
for	Sufis	as	the	prophet	said	“In	the	body	there	is	a	tissue	if	it	is	good	the	whole	body	
becomes	good	and	if	to	goes	bad/corrupt	the	whole	body	becomes	bad/corrupt,	that	
is	 the	 heart”	 (Bukhari,	2018,	p.14).	This	Hadith,	narration	 by	 the	prophet,	 holds	 a	
spiritual	meaning,	which	 is	emphasizing	the	 influence	of	the	heart	on	the	whole	of	
the	person	and	that	it	is	the	core	where	either	goodness	or	corruption	lies.	
It	is	worthwhile	to	note	that	the	Arabic	word	used	for	corrupt	is	fasada,	which	is	
also	used	to	describe	a	food	that	has	gone	rotten	and	is	inedible3.	This	implies	that	
the	heart’s	purpose,	telos,	 is	 to	become	good,	 and	that	 if	 it	doesn’t	 achieve	what	 it	
was	meant	to	achieve	it	becomes	bad	or	corrupt.	The	prophet	also	said	“Allah	does	
not	look	at	your	bodies	nor	your	outer	images	but	looks	at	your	hearts”	(ibn	Hassan	
&	al-Bukhari,	2008,	p.117),	which	doesn’t	 literally	mean	that	Allah	doesn’t	see	our	
bodies	or	outer	realties	since	He	 is	all-seeing	and	all-knowing,	but	rather	 it	means	
that	the	heart	is	the	center	point	of	Allah’s	pleasure	or	dissatisfaction	of	a	person.	A	
sound	heart	as	stated	by	Ibn	Qayyim	al-Jawziyyah	(691/1292),	one	that	is	accepted	
by	Allah,	 is	one	that	is	 free	 from	worship	of	anything	except	Allah	(Ibn	Qayyim	al-
Jawziyyah,	2011).	On	the	other	hand,	a	heart	that	is	immersed	with	other	than	Allah	
is	veiled	from	Him.	This	aligns	greatly	with	Islam’s	prime	spiritual	expression,	Sha-
hada,	which	is;	there	is	no	God	except	Allah.	The	Shahada	is	divided	into	two	oppos-
ing	halves	of	negation	and	affirmation;	the	negation	of	the	reality	of	the	self	and	the	
world,	and	the	affirmation	of	 the	absolute	unity	and	sovereignty	of	Allah	(Chittick,	
                                                
3	See	https://www.almaany.com/ar/dict/ar-ar/فسد/	
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2008).	This	provides	a	 lens	to	understand	how	the	Sufi’s	 foundation	 is	centralized	
on	attaining	the	sound	heart	that	receives	God’s	knowledge	and	satisfaction.		
 
Takhallī,	Taḥallī,	Tajallī	
Another	 important	Sufi	3-step	principle	that	resonates	with	this	same	theme	is	
Takhallī	(emptying/	disclaim/	abnegate),	Taḥallī	(adorned/	fulfillment/	wearing	of	
jewelry),	and	Tajallī	(revelation/	enlightenment)	(Nakissa,	2019,	p.	112).	Which	ap-
plies	 in	 applying	 Shahada	 in	 the	 heart	 by	 negating	 and	 abandoning	 anything	 the	
heart	 is	 immersed	 in	or	attached	to,	whether	 it	be	ego	related	or	something	of	 the	
world,	which	 is	 the	 first	part	of	Shahada,	 removing	all	 from	 the	heart	 except	God.	
Following	that	affirming	and	adorning	God	as	the	step	of	taḥallī,	which	will	then	lead	
to	the	third	and	final	step	of	tajallī,	that	is	revelation	and	being	illuminated	with	the	
knowledge	from	God.	Al-Ghazālī	uses	the	same	approach	and	strategy	in	his	work	as	
he	first	deals	greatly	with	the	removal	of	the	vices	(takhallī),	then	with	the	explica-
tion	of	 the	virtues	(taḥallī),	and	 finally	with	 chapters	on	 love	and	devotion	to	God	
(tajallī).	 This	 gives	 us	 answers	 to	 potential	 inquires	 regarding	whether	 it	 is	 suffi-
cient	 to	 remove	vices	 to	 reaching	virtue.	The	 removal	of	 vices	 leads	 to	 the	attain-
ment	of	some	virtues,	yet	not	all	virtues	are	reached	just	by	the	removal	of	the	vices.	
As	 is	demonstrated,	 the	 removal	of	 vices	 is	considered	to	be	a	 separate	 first	stage	
towards	divine	union.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 first	stage	of	 takhallī	in	which	the	slaying	of	 the	
ego	occurs,	which	represents	the	resolution	of	vices	and	attainment	of	correspond-
ing	virtues.	In	 the	second	stage,	 it	is	the	Sufi’s	attitude	to	adorn	himself	with	addi-
tional	virtues	and	traits;	as	Muḥyī	al-Dīn	Ibn	al-‘Arabī	(d.	1240	CE),	a	prime	Sufi	the-
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orist,	 explains	 as	 acquiring	 and	 internalizing	 the	 morals	 of	 God	 (al-takhaluq	 bi	
akhlaq	Allah)	or	internalizing	the	names	of	God	(al-takhaluq	bi	asma	Allah),	both	in-
dicating	the	same	meaning	(Chittick,	1989,	p.	14).	A	way	to	see	 it	 is	like	cleaning	a	
mirror	(the	heart)	from	all	impurities	and	dust	(takhallī),	facing	this	mirror	towards	
the	desired	object	(taḥallī-	traits	of	God),	receiving	the	reflection	on	the	mirror	of	the	
desired	object	(tajallī).	Reaching	Sufi	virtue	is	reaching	that	heart	that	has	the	vices	
removed	from,	had	God	traits	adorned	with,	and	is	in	reception	of	God’s	revelation.		
This	gives	us	an	understanding	of	a	whole	other	domain	of	virtues	that	is	distin-
guished	from	the	ones	acquired	by	successfully	slaying	the	ego	and	is	only	attained	
after	the	diminishing	of	 the	ego.	 In	 this	way,	 the	becoming	of	 the	Sufi	virtue	or	al-
insān	al-kāmil	is	possible.	
“Perfection	of	īmān	is	based	on	purifying	the	heart	from	those	qualities	dis-
liked	by	Allāh,	and	then	adorning	it	with	those	qualities	beloved	to	Him.	Thus	
purification	is	half	of	īmān.”	(FFR,	p.	64)	
 
Examining	the	Nafs	
The	second	most	important	part	of	the	human	for	the	Sufis,	I	would	argue,	is	the	
self	or	 the	ego,	al	nafs.	That	 is	because	 it	 is	considered	to	be	the	veil	between	one	
and	God.	The	prophet	also	referred	to	al-nafs	as	one’s	worst	enemy	(ibn	Hassan	&	al-
Bukhari,	2008,	p.122).	I	would	claim	that	the	ego	is	what	poisons	the	heart	and	that	
it	is	the	cause	of	its	illness.	Hence	the	purification,	tazkiya,	would	require	two	things	
1)	getting	rid	of	the	ego	and	2)	resolving	its	effects	on	the	heart.	
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Al-Ghazālī	gave	a	crucial	definition	of	al-nafs,	which	I	find	this	part	to	be	one	of	the	
most	critical	examinations	 in	 this	 thesis	 that	allows	us	to	uniquely	understand	the	
ontology	of	 the	ego	within	the	Sufi	 context.	He	 said	 it	 could	be	understood	 in	 two	
completely	different	ways.	First	meaning	of	al-nafs,	is	“the	inclusive	meaning	of	po-
tencies	of	anger	and	temptation”	(RRS,	p.	4).	This	meaning,	al-Ghazālī	noted,	 is	 the	
one	that	is	commonly	used	by	Sufis.		
 
“…since	they	(Sufis)	want	from	the	ego	(nafs)	is	the	origin	that	combines	all	
vices	of	the	human,	so	they	say	it	is	necessary	to	struggle	with	the	ego	(nafs)	
and	break	it.”	(RRS,	p.	6)	
“…	and	he	(Sahl	Ibn	Abdullah	Al	Tustarī)	said:	and	know	that	there	is	no	sal-
vation	for	anyone	in	this	era	except	by	slaying	one’s	ego	(thabh	nafsuho)	and	
killing	it	by	hunger,	sleeplessness,	and	effort/struggle.”	(RRS,	p.	133)		
 
For	the	purposes	of	this	thesis	we	shall	refer	to	this	version	of	the	nafs	as	‘ego’.	It	
is	important	to	mark	that	there	is	no	negative	connotation	in	this	primary	and	core	
definition	of	the	ego	although	it	is	clear	that	the	ego	that	is	ought	to	be	fought.	None-
theless,	stating	that	it	is	the	combining	meaning	of	anger	and	temptation	 implies	a	
morally	neutral	standpoint,	as	 it	will	be	further	discussed	that	it	 is	only	the	 imbal-
ances	and	excess	of	 these	potencies	 that	yield	vices	and	 immoral	behavior.	On	the	
other	hand	virtues	and	moral	behavior	are	found	in	balancing	these	potencies.	That	
gives	us	an	important	hint	that	within	the	Sufi	view,	humans	are	not	perceived	by	all	
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means	as	 intrinsically	evil.	 In	actual	 fact	 it	 is	 the	mission	of	man’s	 journey	 to	God	
and	morality	 to	restrain	not	purge	anger	and	temptation	as	 to	advance	 in	 spiritual	
and	moral	ranks.	
As	for	the	second	meaning	of	nafs,	al-Ghazālī	defines	it	as	follows:	
“…	and	it	is	the	gentle	(laṭīfa)	that	we	mentioned	[he	previously	defined	the	
soul	and	before	that	the	heart],	that	is	truly	the	human,	and	it	is	the	self	of	the	
human	and	his	 identity,	 but	 it	 gets	described	with	 different	descriptions	 in	
relation	to	the	changes	of	its	states.”	(RRS,	p.	6)			
 
What	is	worthy	of	examination	 is	al-Ghazālī’s	use	of	 the	word	laṭīfa,	which	as	a	
word	could	be	translated	as	gentle,	nice,	pleasant,	kind,	friendly,	good-natured,	and	
what	is	likely	referred	to	here:	subtle.	This	other	reference	to	the	nafs	implies	good-
ness	 that	 in	 his	words	describe	 the	essence	of	 human	beings,	which	 says	 that	hu-
mans	are	intrinsically	good-natured	(Chittick,	2008,	p.	7).	Intrinsically	good-natured	
could	mean	that	we	have	innate	dispositions	to	cultivate	virtue,	or	that	we	already	
in	 a	 sense	 have	 such	 goodness	within.	 From	 al-Ghazālī’s	words,	 it	 could	 be	 noted	
that	 the	 human	 holds	 a	 ‘gentle’	 part	 within,	 which	 is	 good-natured	 and	 subtle.	 It	
could	then	be	presumed	that	the	knowledge	of	such	goodness	is	reached	by	the	re-
moval	of	the	ego.	Hence	the	understanding	that	the	removal	of	vices	and	cultivation	
of	virtues,	according	to	the	Sufi	way,	cause	the	flourishing	of	the	goodness	that	is	al-
ready	within.	Another	reference	is	made	in	the	Quran	[7:173]	that	refers	to	a	previ-
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ous	form	of	the	world4	where	all	humans	existed	in	a	different	form	and	were	given	
a	direct	speech	by	Allah	where	He	asked	them	to	“witness	on	themselves”	that	He	is	
their	God	and	Lord.	The	nafs	used	in	this	verse	could	imply	the	nafs	we	are	referring	
to	as	self,	 that	is	not	only	aware	of	God	but	has	witnessed	and	experienced	His	di-
vine	address.	Leaving	us	with	a	more	concrete	understanding	of	 the	deep	intrinsic	
good	nature	of	man.	It	could	be	then	understood	that	the	Sufi	path	is	one	that	recon-
nects	with	this	inner	essence	that	has	divine	secrets	(Umar	Faruq	Abd-Allah,	2014).	
It	is	plausible	to	draw	a	connection	that	ties	this	nafs	with	the	soul	and	the	heart,	
since	the	three	were	described	using	the	same	word,	laṭīfa.	This	version	of	the	nafs	
is	contrary	to	the	previous	one	that	incites	immoral	actions	due	to	irrational	influ-
ences	and	accordingly	veils	one	from	God,	as	this	version	is	the	praised	and	worthy	
one	since	it	is	capable	of	knowing	God.	More	clarification	on	the	composite	of	both	
versions	of	 the	nafs	will	be	explored	and	demonstrated	in	the	coming	sections.	We	
shall	use	‘self’	when	referring	to	this	version	of	the	nafs.	Hence	when	we	talk	about	
slaying	the	ego,	we	do	not	promote	any	suicidal	or	self-destructive	notions	nor	do	
we	imply	degradation	of	the	human’s	worth,	but	rather	the	slaying	of	the	nemesis	of	
the	self	that	in	fact	brings	degradation	and	corruption	to	the	inner	and	outer	worlds.	
This	 distinction	 resolves	 a	 seemingly	 problematic	 inconsistency	 in	 al-Ghazālī’s	
work	regarding	the	notion	of	 ‘greatness	of	 the	 soul’	 (kibar	al-nafs).	Typically	since	
al-Ghazālī’s	pronouncements	on	the	ego	that	it	needs	to	reach	humbleness,	it	is	ex-
pected	for	the	greatness	of	the	soul	to	be	a	vice	that	implies	arrogance	and	pride.	It	
                                                
4	Often	referred	to	as	world	of	‘atom’	(‘ālam	al-dharr)	or	world	of	‘covenant’	(‘ālam	al-mīthāq)	
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is	however	the	case	that	Abū	ʿAlī	Ahmad	ibn	Muhammad	ibn	Yaʿqūb	ibn	Miskawayh	
(932-1030)	 claimed,	 closely	 following	 Aristotle,	 that	 greatness	 of	 soul	 is	 a	 virtue	
(Miskawayh,	 1911).	 What	 even	 might	 appear	 as	 more	 peculiar	 is	 that	 al-Ghazālī	
himself	considered	‘smallness	of	the	soul’	(sighar	al-nafs)	as	a	vice	(RRS,	p.	87).	
The	way	to	understand	and	dissolve	this	apparent	contradiction	is	to	employ	al-
Ghazālī’s	twofold	definitions	of	al-nafs,	which	would	make	us	dismiss	the	first	mean-
ing	that	signifies	ego	and	consider	the	second	meaning	that	we	named	‘self’.	In	this	
understanding,	it	would	be	sensible	to	consider	greatness	of	the	soul	as	a	virtue	and	
branching	out	of	courage,	as	Miskawayh	noted,	since	the	self	withholds	great	poten-
tial	of	goodness	 that	 is	dignifying	to	man,	due	to	 its	 intrinsic	potential	of	knowing	
God.	 This	would	 also	 allow	 for	 interpreting	 smallness	 of	 the	 soul	 or	 self	 as	a	vice	
since	this	is	a	mere	degradation	of	human	potential	that	is	ought	to	be	actualized.	On	
the	other	hand,	if	we	took	al-Ghazālī’s	reference	to	sighar	al-nafs	to	mean	smallness	
of	the	ego	as	a	vice,	then	 it	would	contradict	all	of	his	accounts	on	the	ego	since	it	
has	 been	 disclosed	 that	 the	 ego	 not	 only	 needs	 ‘smallness’	 but	 ‘breaking’	 and	 ‘re-
moval’.	 It	 then	follows	that	sighar	al-nafs	means	not	 the	smallness	of	 the	 ‘ego’,	but	
the	smallness	of	the	‘self’.	
The	Moral	Subject		
Al-Ghazālī	 highlights	 five	 main	 components	 of	 the	 moral	 subject.	 He	 distin-
guishes	the	self	 from	the	ego	(both	referred	to	as	nafs),	as	well	as	referring	to	 the	
soul,	heart,	and	intellect.	In	the	final	sections,	an	illustration	will	be	presented	as	to	
show	how	these	components	link	with	each	other.	It	is	necessary	however	to	clarify	
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at	this	point	that	in	Sufism	there	is	a	strong	acknowledgment	of	the	theological	ties	
between	 the	soul	 and	divine	 command	 in	 Islam,	where	morality	 is	 essentially	em-
phasized	to	bring	the	murīd	closer	to	God	by	progressing	in	the	stages	of	the	self,	as	
will	be	explained	 in	 the	coming	 section.	What	 is	similar	 for	VE,	 especially	 through	
Aristotelian	notions,	is	the	acknowledgment	of	the	existence	of	the	soul.	But	Aristo-
tle’s	 epistemic	 approach	 to	 define	 such	 soul	 and	 identify	 its	 components	 remains	
questionable.	 Unlike	 the	 Sufi’s	 classification	 of	 the	 human’s	 components,	 Aristotle	
mentions	only	the	soul	as	the	non-material	form	within	the	human	(Aristotle,	2006).	
It	 is	 clear	 that	both	 traditions,	 Sufism	 and	VE,	 assume	relations	 between	morality	
and	 flourishing	of	 the	human	soul,	noting	 that	Aristotle	 doesn’t	 fully	present	why	
morality	does	flourish	the	soul	the	same	way	Sufis	do.		
 
States	and	Stages	of	the	Self	
In	 Islam,	 there	 are	Quranic	 references	 to	 three	main	 states	of	 the	 self:	 (1)	evil	
commanding	self	(nafs	ammāra	b-il-sū’),	which	refers	to	the	domination	and	sover-
eignty	of	the	ego	over	the	self	(2)	blaming	self	(nafs	al-lawwāma),	which	means	that	
the	self	is	blaming	the	individual	whenever	he	is	involved	in	immoral	actions5	(we’ll	
describe	this	state	as	‘struggling	self’	since	this	denotes	a	meaning	that	refers	to	the	
self	being	in	battle	with	the	ego);	and	(3)	the	serene	self	(nafs	al-muṭma’inna)	(RRS,	
p.	6).	Al-Ghazālī	clarified	that	the	condition	for	reaching	this	state	is	that	the	nafs	be-
                                                
5	al-Ghazālī	mentioned	that	the	self	is	blaming	its	owner	for	its	shortcomings,	which	might	raise	an	inquiry	of	an	
existence	of	a	third	entity	(owner)	that	is	different	from	ego	and	self.	Meaning	is	the	owner	of	the	self	a	different	
being	than	the	self	and	the	ego?	If	it	is	a	different	part	then	the	ontology	of	the	self	is	threefold,	but	it	could	also	
be	interpreted	that	the	self	blames	the	ego	for	‘its’	shortcomings,	which	in	this	manner	preserves	the	dual	ontol-
ogy	of	the	ego	and	self.	
Page 34 of 86 
come	peacefully	obedient	and	become	free	from	disturbance	that	results	from	going	
against	 the	 desires.	 Therefore	 according	 to	al-Ghazālī’s	 account,	 slaying	 the	ego	 is	
sufficient	and	necessary	 for	reaching	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna.	 It	 is	very	 important	 to	
note	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	what	we	earlier	referred	to	as	Sufi	virtue	is	a	condi-
tion	for	reaching	al-nafs	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna,	since	al-Ghazālī	only	stated	in	defin-
ing	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	that	it	requires	redemption	from	the	ego.	He	did	not	iden-
tify	its	relations	to	attainment	of	Sufi	Virtue.	Slaying	the	ego	is	necessary	but	not	suf-
ficient	 for	 reaching	Sufi	 virtue.	More	on	 this	will	be	disclosed	 in	the	ending	of	 the	
chapter.	
The	holistic	way	to	see	the	states	of	the	self	is	to	understand	it	through	a	three-
step	process.	This	process	aims	to	transform	and	liberate	the	person	from	the	sov-
ereignty	of	 the	ego	over	the	self,	going	through	an	 inner	struggle	between	the	ego	
and	the	self,	in	order	to	finally	achieve	mastery	and	sovereignty	of	the	self	over	the	
ego	 (RRS,	 p.	 84).	 This	happens	 in	 the	 form	of	 sequential	 stages	 that	 represent	ad-
vanced	states	of	the	self;	meaning	that	the	second	state	is	higher	than	the	first	one	
and	the	third	state	is	higher	than	the	second	one.	It	could	be	inferred	that	struggle	
and	 inner	 combat	 happens	 only	 in	 the	 second	state	where	 the	 self	 and	ego	are	 in	
conflict	for	dominance.	This	battle	for	dominance	shouldn’t	be	thought	of	as	a	battle	
between	 two	alike	materialistic	 entities	 since	 the	 ego	 and	 the	 self	 have	 their	 own	
metaphysical	truths,	which	bring	many	limitations	to	our	efforts	to	fully	capture	the	
essence	of	 this	reality.	Nonetheless	it	could	be	conceptualized	that	since	al-Ghazālī	
relates	the	self	to	the	soul	and	heart	by	using	the	same	word	‘laṭīfa’	in	describing	the	
three	 (self,	 soul,	 and	heart),	 then	 it	 is	 associated	with	good	morality	and	 intellect.	
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While,	as	stated	above,	the	ego	could	be	considered	a	faculty	that	is	non-rational	and	
merely	holds	the	potencies	of	anger	and	temptation,	 it	will	be	explained	in	coming	
sections	how	al-Ghazālī	maps	out	the	vices	that	come	out	of	excessive	and	deficient	
balances	of	these	potencies.	These	potencies	are	beautified	when	they	are	in	moder-
ation	to	represent	bravery	(beautification	of	anger	potency)	and	temperance	(beau-
tification	of	temptation	potency):		
“And	the	goodness	of	the	anger	potency	and	its	moderation	is	expressed	by	
bravery.	And	the	goodness	of	 the	temptation	potency	and	 its	moderation	 is	
expressed	by	temperance/integrity	(‘iffa)…”	(RRS,	p.	86)	
	
He	 then	 continues	 to	 explain	 in	 the	 following	 lines	 that	 if	 the	 ‘anger	 potency’	
reached	 excess	 it	would	be	 called	 recklessness,	 and	 its	 deficiency	would	be	 called	
cowardice.	 Same	 with	 the	 ‘temptation	 potency’	 that	 its	 excess	 would	 lead	 to	
lust/gluttony	and	its	deficiency	would	lead	to	insensibility.	In	describing	the	golden	
mean	 considering	 these	 two	areas,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 al-Ghazālī	does	not	use	bravery	
and	temperance,	but	 rather	uses	anger	and	temptation	potencies	 to	describe	 their	
lack	of	moderation.	It	doesn’t	seem	that	al-Ghazālī	gives	a	clear	account	on	why	he	
believes	that	bravery	is	the	moderation	of	the	anger	potency	and	temperance	is	the	
moderation	of	the	temptation	potency.	In	a	few	passages	later	he	adds:	
	
“…	And	we	mean	by	bravery:	the	anger	potency	being	in	submission/lead	by	
the	 intellect	 in	 its	 release	 and	 its	 restrain.	 And	 by	 temperance	 (‘iffa)	 we	
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mean:	the	discipline	of	the	potency	of	temptation	in	accord	with	the	intellect	
and	Islamic	law	(shar’)”	(RRS,	p.	86)	
 
Al-Ghazālī	didn’t	justify	why	exactly	is	it	the	case	that	regulating	anger	leads	to	
bravery.	 Nonetheless,	 Aristotle	 stated	 that	 temperance	 is	 reached	 by	 ‘abstaining’	
from	pleasures,	but	linked	courage	with	the	moderation	of	fear	not	anger	(Aristotle,	
1999,	Book	II:	9).	However,	it	is	in	Plato’s	Republic	that	the	relations	between	anger	
and	courage	is	described	(Parry,	1996).	
It	is	however	sufficient	for	this	section	to	know	that	these	two	potencies	repre-
sent	 two	main	cardinal	virtues	of	morality	along	with	 two	other	virtues	 that	don’t	
reside	in	 the	ego,	which	are	 justice	and	wisdom,	yet	are	needed	to	be	used	to	slay	
the	ego.	This	restates	an	 important	claim:	slaying	the	ego	 is	understood	as	merely	
the	 adjustment	 of	 one’s	 levels	 of	 anger	 and	 temptation	 sufficient	 for	 a	 person	 to	
reach	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna,	yet	necessary	but	insufficient	for	a	person	to	reach	Sufi	
Virtue.	This	is	because	the	Sufi	virtue	would	entail	excellence	in	all	morality	that	in-
cludes	other	virtues,	not	just	moderation	in	anger	and	temptation.	More	important-
ly,	in	Sufism	it	is	viewed	that	the	prophet	is	the	only	person	to	have	reached	excel-
lence	in	virtue	(RRS,	p.	87),	Sufi	virtue.	Nonetheless,	reaching	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	
is	not	exclusive	to	the	prophet	due	to	his	attainment	of	excellence	in	virtue,	but	ra-
ther	it	is	the	condition	for	the	‘slaying	of	the	ego’	as	mentioned	earlier6.	Therefore,	
                                                
6	See	page	30	
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reaching	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	is	separate	from	attaining	excellence	in	virtue	or	Sufi	
virtue.	
The	struggle,	 jihād,	 could	be	hence	conceptualized	as	a	result	of	 the	awakening	
or	determination	of	the	self	to	seize	control	over	the	levels	of	anger	and	temptation	
that	reside	within	the	individual	under	the	label	of	the	ego,	and	adjust	them	to	cour-
age	and	temperance	 instead	of	having	no	restrictions	over	them.	This	 is	similar	 to	
Plato’s	accounts	of	the	psychic	conflict	in	which	the	intellect	establishes	power	over	
anger	and	appetite	(Buccioni,	2002).		
The	Anatomy	of	the	Nafs	
 
Nafs	
 
	 	 	 			Ego	 	 	 	 Self	
 
	 Anger	 	 Temptation	
 
It	 is	 these	 two	potencies,	 anger	and	 temptation,	 that	determine	 the	ego’s	main	
anatomy.	Referring	to	al-Ghazālī’s	important	note	that	ascetic	practices	on	the	nafs	
should	be	stopped	once	it	reached	moderation	(RRS,	p.	153),	which	means	that	the	
only	purpose	for	ascetic-like	practices	is	to	bring	the	potencies	to	moderation.	It	is	
not	implausible	to	suggest	that	the	ego	is	the	persona	of	the	imbalances	of	these	two	
potencies	 coming	 together;	 hence	when	we	 say	 ‘untamed	 ego’	we	mean	 the	 same	
thing	as	when	we	say	‘untamed	potencies’	that	operate	with	minimal	or	no	intellec-
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tual	or	moral	authority.	This	personified	ego	possibly	shares	a	metaphysical	reality	
corresponding	to	the	reality	of	 these	potencies	 that	compose	 it.	Which	means	that	
Sufis	 commonly	 portray	 the	 personified	 ego	 as	 an	 entity	 that	 behaves	 in	 certain	
ways	and	patterns,	when	referring	to	‘nafs’	in	the	ego	context,	like	for	example	com-
paring	 it	with	a	child	 that	behaves	 irrationally	or	an	entity	 that	 sneaks	to	 trick	 its	
possessor	into	vice.	Regardless	of	the	truth	of	that	persona,	we	now	know	that	its	off	
button	is	in	regulating	its	potencies.	Hence	it	is	clear	that	by	appropriately	regulat-
ing	the	 levels	of	 these	potencies,	 the	ego	diminishes	and	perishes	completely	with	
the	agent’s	attainment	of	moderation.	As	it	only	comes	to	existence	as	long	as	there	
are	 imbalances	occurring	 in	 the	 levels	 of	 the	 potencies,	 as	 per	 our	 analyses	 of	 al-
Ghazālī’s	 description	 of	 the	 ego,	 and	 should	 be	 tamed	 and	 fought	 then.	 The	 real	
question	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 asked	 here	 is:	 what	 tells	 us	 that	 these	 potencies	 are	 in	
moderation?	What	standards	should	be	met	in	order	for	an	agent	to	achieve	moder-
ation?	What	is	it	to	strike	and	maintain	the	right	balances	of	anger	and	temptation?	
It	is	possible	for	different	virtue	ethicists	to	have	differing	and	subjective	views	
of	what	 constitutes	 ‘moderation’	with	 respect	 to	anger	and	 temptation,	but	 this	 is	
not	the	case	for	Sufis	as	there	is	one	universal	standard	for	morality	and	moderation	
exhibited	in	(1)	theological	references	found	in	the	Quran	and	(2)	one	primary	hu-
man	standard	for	morality,	which	is	the	prophet	Muhammad.	As	it	will	be	explored	
later,	reaching	moderation	in	Sufism	requires	considering	spiritual	truths	and	prac-
tices,	because	there	are	vices	that	are	found	in	Sufism	that	are	not	as	highlighted	in	
other	virtue	theories	such	as	love	of	dunyā	(this	earthly	life)	and	riyā’	(ostentation),	
primarily	due	to	their	association	with	insincerity	with	Allah.	The	goal	of	regulating	
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temptation	 or	 anger	 could	 be	achieved	 through	 the	 removal	 of	 the	 corresponding	
vice.	This	means	that	moderation	for	a	Sufi	is	different	than	moderation	for	an	Aris-
totelian	even	if	both	are	talking	about	the	same	potencies,	and	this	distinguished	the	
Sufi	goal	and	path	from	other	virtue	theories.	That	is	because	the	Sufi	and	the	Aris-
totelian	will	both	 acknowledge	 a	 virtue	 of	 generosity	 that	 an	agent	 holds,	 yet	 this	
agent,	even	if	had	attained	phornesis	as	Aristotle	defines	it,	will	still	be	considered	by	
Sufis	to	have	missed	the	attainment	of	other	certain	virtues	and	would	still	need	to	
remove	some	vices	that	are	not	mentioned	by	Aristotle.	Accordingly	Sufism	aims	to	
provide,	what	the	Sufis	claim	to	be,	a	more	complete	picture	of	virtue	that	includes	
spiritual	 realities:	one	offering	a	more	 comprehensive,	cohesive,	 and	analytical	 ac-
counts	of	virtue	and	egoism.		
It	 is	 also	 inferred	 from	 the	 states	 of	 the	 self	 that	 the	 ego	 is	 unchallenged	 and	
obeyed	in	the	 first	state	since	there	 is	no	struggle	 that	 is	 taking	place,	and	 is	com-
pletely	at	rest	 in	 the	third	state	as	 the	self	 is	purified	 from	the	ego.	This	makes	us	
draw	 a	 similarity	 between	 the	 first	 and	 third	 stage	 that	 both	 share	 something	 in	
common,	which	is	that	there	 is	no	diminishing	of	 the	ego	that	 is	taking	place	in	ei-
ther	states.	 If	we	agree	that	diminishing	 the	ego	 is	 the	goal	 for	 the	murīd	and	this	
could	only	be	done	through	combating	the	ego,	jihād	al-nafs,	then	we	need	to	assert	
that	this	jihād	is	only	in	occurrence	as	long	as	the	second	state	of	the	self	is	in	action.	
That	is	to	say	that	all	the	attempts	and	actions	that	aim	to	achieve	moderation	in	the	
potencies	happen	in	this	state.	The	closer	the	potencies	get	to	moderation,	the	closer	
the	murīd	gets	to	al-nafs	al	mutmaena.	
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We	will	 use	 a	 few	 geometrical	 representations	 that	 could	 enable	 us	 to	 better	
conceptualize	 the	 relations	between	 diminishing	or	 slaying	 the	ego7,	 and	 reaching	
moderation	and	achieving	the	golden	mean.	
The	first	graph	will	show	the	relations	between	the	states	of	the	self	represented	
by	the	x-axis,	and	the	manifestation	of	the	ego	represented	by	the	y-axis.	
 
	
The	graph	illustrates	the	manifestation	or	level	of	the	ego,	showing	the	diminish-
ing	of	the	ego	as	progression	occurs	in	the	states	of	the	self.	Point	A	(-2,0)	represents	
the	nafs	ammāra	b-il-sū’,	 point	B	(-1,0)	represents	 the	peak	of	al-nafs	al-lawwāma,	
and	point	C	(0,0)	represents	the	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna.	
                                                
7	A	question	could	be	asked	whether	the	slaying	of	the	ego	is	irreversible,	meaning	could	the	ego	come	back	af-
ter	being	slayed?	The	answer	is	that	it	is	possible	since	Sufis	believe	that	only	prophets	are	immune	to	mistakes,	
but	saints	however	are	‘protected’	from	the	ego	and	its	possibility	to	rise	again.	Death	of	the	ego	for	the	saints	
and	the	ones	reaching	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	would	technically	mean	the	preservation	from	the	ego,	since	it	is	
only	the	prophets	who	are	undoubtedly	had	no	possibility	of	the	ego	manifesting	by	God’s	will.		
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Considering	the	y-axis,	value	(1)	represents	maximum	manifestation	of	 the	ego	
while	value	(0)	signifies	zero	ego	or	death	of	ego.	It	is	the	case	that	point	B	marks	a	
midway	position	in	the	level	of	the	ego.	
As	 for	 the	x-axis,	 the	justification	of	 the	allocation	of	 the	nafs	ammāra	b-il-sū’at	
point	(-2,0)	 is	because	the	nafs	ammāra	b-il-sū’	is	 thought	to	be	a	negative	state	of	
the	self,	which	advances	to	actualize	better	states	represented	in	progression	along	
the	x-axis.	As	 for	 the	conceptualization	of	having	al	nafs	al	moutamena	 at	 the	 zero	
mark	symbolizes	two	things:	1)	the	end	of	the	negative	states	of	the	self	and	2)	the	
inauguration	of	infinitely	incrementing	higher	states	of	the	self	beyond	that	point.	
It	 could	 be	 inquired	whether	 if	 the	nafs	al-lawwāma	 is	 exclusive	 to	 point	B	 or	
not?	Or	 in	other	words,	where	does	 it	start	and	where	does	 it	end?	The	answer	 is	
simply	that	it	is	the	region	in	the	x-axis	that	starts	right	after	point	A	and	ends	right	
before	point	C	{A<x<C,	where	x	represents	al-nafs	al-lawwāma}.	Which	means	that	
maximum	ego	 level	 declines	 as	al-nafs	al-lawwāma	 advances	 till	 it	 reaches	 to	 the	
point	of	 zero	 struggle	exhibited	 in	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	 (0,0).	The	general	 idea	 is	
that	commitment	to	ascetic-like	practices	that	aim	to	reach	moderation	for	the	ego’s	
potencies	are	correlated	to	the	advancement	of	the	states	of	the	self,	which	indicate	
the	level	of	the	ego’s	manifestation.	It	is	important	to	note	that	slaying	the	ego	and	
al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	are	conjuncts;	the	slaying	of	the	ego	means	that	the	self	is	ar-
riving	 at	 al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna,	 and	 the	 self’s	 attainment	 of	 al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	
means	the	slaying	of	its	ego.	
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Another	 graph	 conceptualizes	 the	 change	 in	 resistance	 (against	 the	 self)	 or	
struggle	of	the	ego	in	relation	to	the	states	of	the	self	in	linear	and	non-linear	repre-
sentations.	It	is	worthy	to	note	that	these	two	representations	are	the	simple	possi-
ble	graphical	 illustrations	of	 three	known	points.	With	 the	x-axis	 representing	 the	
states	of	the	self	and	the	y-axis	representing	the	resistance	of	the	ego.	The	justifica-
tion	of	 this	graph	relies	on	 the	 selection	of	 the	three	main	points	demonstrated	 in	
the	following	paragraph.	
Similar	to	the	previous	graph;	point	A	(-2,0)	represents	the	first	state	of	the	self	
where	the	ego	is	in	its	most	manifestation.	The	ego	is	not	in	resistance	because	it	is	
unchallenged	and	is	in	no	struggle	with	the	self	hence	assigned	the	value	(0)	for	its	
y-axis.	As	 for	point	C	 (0,0)	 that	 represents	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	where	 the	ego	 is	
perished,	the	ego	is	not	in	resistance	since	the	ego	is	no	longer	manifested	hence	as-
signed	 the	 value	 (0)	 for	 its	 y-axis.	 While	 point	 B	 (-1,1)	 represents	 peak	 ego	 re-
sistance	with	peak	self	struggle,	hence	assigned	maximum	value	(1)	in	the	y-axis.		
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The	zone	between	points	A	and	C	indicates	that	there	is	resistance	occurring	by	
the	ego	 that	 increments	towards	closeness	to	point	B	moving	 from	 its	 initial	 state	
that	is	point	A,	and	such	resistance	decrements	from	point	B	till	it	reaches	point	C.	
Such	illustration	reveals	the	change	in	intensity	of	the	ego’s	struggle	as	the	self	
advances	in	its	states.		
 
	
As	for	this	graph,	it	represents	the	relations	between	the	principle	of	the	golden	
mean	(y-axis)	and	the	states	of	the	self	(x-axis).	The	y-axis	demonstrates	the	golden	
mean’s	threefold	components	of	excess,	deficiency,	and	golden	mean.	The	represen-
tation	of	(1)	on	the	y-axis	represents	maximum	excess,	(0)	represents	golden	mean,	
and	(-1)	on	the	y-axis	represents	deficiency	of	any	given	virtue.	Point	A	on	the	x-axis	
(-2,0)	still	represents	the	nafs	ammāra	b-il-sū’	where	the	maximum	ego	is	manifest-
ed,	while	point	C	also	represents	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna.	This	time	point	A	conjoins	
two	points	on	the	y-axis	represented	in	the	graph	at	X	(-2,1)	and	Y	(-2,	-1).	X	repre-
sents	maximum	ego	 level	 and	maximum	excess,	while	Y	 represents	maximum	ego	
level	and	maximum	deficiency.	Which	uniquely	highlights	the	relations	between	the	
ego	level	found	in	the	state	of	the	self	and	the	closeness	of	the	virtue	towards	reach-
-2	
-1	
-1	
0	
1	
1	
2	
-3	 -2	 -2	 -1	 -1	 0	
Golden	Mean	
(Non	Linear)	
-2	
-1	
-1	
0	
1	
1	
2	
-3	 -2	 -2	 -1	 -1	 0	
Golden	Mean	
(Non	Linear)	
Page 44 of 86 
ing	moderation	and	the	golden	mean.	The	final	graph	emphasizes	and	makes	clear	of	
al-Ghazālī’s	remark	concerning	stopping	ascetic	practices	on	the	ego	once	modera-
tion	is	achieved	(RRS,	p.	153).	That	is	because	as	long	as	the	ego	manifests,	the	gold-
en	mean	wouldn’t	be	achieved	and	that	it	is	the	case	that	achieving	the	golden	mean	
correlates	with	the	death	of	the	ego.		
	
On	Unity	of	Virtue	and	Unity	of	Nafs	
In	order	to	reach	concluding	analysis	from	the	above	mentioned	graphs,	we	need	
to	 recognize	 the	main	opinions	 regarding	 the	 unity	 of	 virtue	 that	 is	 the	 view	 that	
traces	back	to	Plato	and	Socrates	that	gives	an	understanding	of	the	oneness	of	vir-
tue	(unity	of	virtue	reference).	What	we	will	refer	to	as	Unity	of	Virtue	A	will	denote	
to	 the	interpretation	that	all	virtues	are	one	in	the	sense	that	 the	agent	is	virtuous	
and	has	attained	whole	virtue	only	when	he	acquires	all	the	individual	virtues	or,	as	
we	might	say	the	‘parts’	of	virtue.	What	we	will	refer	to	as	Unity	of	Virtue	B	refers	to	
the	other	opinion	that	suggests	that	mastering	one	virtue	means	that	the	agent	will	
automatically	have	the	other	parts	virtues.	
An	important	argument	could	be	then	deduced	after	such	illustrations	and	anal-
yses:	
P1:	The	attainment	of	virtue	requires	slaying	the	ego	(Golden	Mean	Graph)	
P2:	Unity	of	Virtue	A	indicates	that	there	are	two	possible	manifestations	of	
virtue:	part	virtue	or	whole	virtue	
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C1:	Slaying	the	ego	requires	two	possible	manifestations:	part	ego	or	whole	
ego	
P3:	Slaying	the	ego	and	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	are	conjuncts		
C2:	 Al-nafs	 al-muṭma’inna	 requires	 two	 possible	 manifestations:	 part	 nafs	
muṭma’inna	or	whole	nafs	muṭma’inna	
 
This	argument	 demonstrates	 that	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	 could	 be	 looked	as	 ei-
ther	part	or	whole	as	a	consequent	of	slaying	the	ego	of	part	or	whole.	Meaning	that	
slaying	the	whole	ego	of	man	will	lead	his	whole	self	to	venture	the	state	of	al-nafs	
al-muṭma’inna.	Also	the	slaying	of	the	ego	concerning	certain	vices	will	lead	to	ven-
turing	 part	 of	 al-nafs	 al-muṭma’inna.	 It	 is	 possible	 to	 have	 part	 of	 the	 whole	 ego	
slayed	and	part	not	depending	on	the	vices	resolved,	similarly	it	is	possible	to	have	
part	of	 the	whole	nafs	al-muṭma’inna	 experienced	and	part	not	also	depending	on	
the	vices	resolved.	This	view	remarkably	presents	how	the	individual	could	engage	
with	 the	 three	 states	of	 the	 self	 in	a	dynamic	multilateral	way	 instead	of	 thinking	
that	a	person	is	either	one	state	or	the	other.	This	resolves	possible	tensions	in	un-
derstanding	how	could	the	three	states	become	relatable	 to	almost	any	 individual,	
and	also	regarding	understanding	the	nature	of	alternating	between	these	states.	It	
is	now	clear	that	a	person	could	experience	part	of	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	concerning	
a	 certain	 aspect,	 yet	 at	 the	 same	 time	 experience	 the	 other	 two	 states	 concerning	
other	areas.	I	shall	refer	to	this	contribution	as	unity	of	nafs,	as	it	is	inspired	from	the	
unity	of	virtue	account.	
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For	this	work	to	present	even	clearer	accounts	on	the	ontology	and	anatomy	of	
the	ego,	 a	map	will	be	presented	 in	the	 coming	chapter	 that	will	 classify	 the	vices	
that	need	elimination	 for	 the	ego	 to	 be	 slayed	and	 for	 the	 self	 to	 reach	al-nafs	al-
muṭma’inna.	
	
	
Chapter	3:	Morality	in	Sufism,	and	Relations	with	Virtue	Ethics	
 
A	 famous	 Hadith	 describes	 the	 prophet’s	 mission	 regarding	 morality	 is	 often	
translated	 as:	 “I	was	 sent	 to	 perfect/complete	 good/noble	moral	 character	 traits”	
(Bernard	&	Chittick,	1994,	p.48).	 The	Arabic	word	makārim	 is	 translated	 to	noble	
and	the	word	akhlāq	is	the	plural	word	of	morality,	so	the	prophet	states	that	he	is	
sent	to	pefect	makārim	al-akhlāq,	translated	above	as	noble	morality.	I	will	provide	
however	another	interpretation,	hence	translation,	to	these	words	that	could	possi-
bly	clarify	deeper	implications	of	this	Hadith.	The	word	makārim	also	means	‘gener-
osities’,	which	could	be	then	used	to	mean,	“I	was	sent	to	perfect/complete	the	gen-
erosities	of	morality”.	This	suggests	 that	morality	is	 ‘generous’	 (rich	with	things	to	
give)	 to	 its	 agent,	 which	 means	 that	 it	 gives	 its	 agent	 almost	 unending	 benefits	
(could	be	pleasures,	satisfaction,	closeness	to	God,	happiness,	etc.)	upon	 its	attain-
ment.	As	far	as	the	prophet’s	mission	is	concerned,	he	is	sent	to	complete	this	‘gen-
erous’	offering	that	morality	could	provide	to	its	agent	and	bring	it	to	its	full	poten-
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tial	by	providing	mankind	with	the	Islamic	paradigm	that	allows	any	 individual	 to	
establish	a	flourishing	relationship	with	God.	
The	prophet	is	considered	by	Muslims	to	be	the	epitome	of	human	excellence,	let	
alone	morality.	 According	 to	 this	 interpretation,	 the	 prophet	 attained	 himself	 the	
maximum	 ‘generosities’	 of	morality,	 since	 his	 excellence	 of	morality.	Nonetheless,	
his	mission	is	to	guide	mankind	to	follow	his	teachings,	attitude,	behavior,	and	prac-
tices	as	to	allow	agents	reach	perfection	of	morality	and	its	generous	offering.	This	
interpretation	asserts	the	prophet’s	use	of	the	word	‘completion’,	where	he	did	not	
use	 either	 ‘elimination’	 or	 ‘innovation’	 to	 describe	 his	 mission	 on	 morality.	 This	
means	 that	he	accepted	preceding	accounts	and	 interpretations	of	morality	and	 is	
only	claiming	to	complete	what	has	been	missing	by	these	accounts.		This	gives	us	a	
clearer	understanding	of	the	Islamic	view	of	morality,	as	mentioned	in	the	beginning	
of	the	second	chapter	and	as	will	be	further	demonstrated,	that	 the	Islamic	or	Sufi	
view	gives	a	wider	and	a	more	complete	moral	 framework	than	other	moral	 theo-
ries.	
Interestingly,	 morality	 in	 Arabic	 as	 defined	 by	 al-Ghazālī,	 is	 inherent	 in	 one’s	
character.	 Al-Ghazālī	 highlights	 that	 the	 word	 ‘khalq’8	describes	 one’s	 outer	 form,	
while	 ‘khuluq’	(which	 is	 the	same	root	word	and	consists	of	 the	exact	same	 letters	
but	with	 different	 accent),	describes	 one’s	 inner	 image	 (RRS,	 p.	 84).	He	 describes	
that	when	a	person	is	labeled	ḥasan	(good)	al-khuluq,	then	the	person	is	praised	for	
his	outer	image,	and	when	the	person	is	labeled	hasan	al	khuluq,	then	the	person	is	
                                                
8	‘Khalq’	also	means	‘creation’		
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praised	 for	his	 inner	 image,	 that	 is	his	morality.	He	 further	explains	 that	 a	human	
consists	of	body	and	soul,	 the	body	part	(outer)	is	perceived	with	sight	of	 the	eye,	
basar.	 As	 for	 the	 soul	 part	 (inner),	 it	 is	 perceived	 with	 insight	 (spiritual	 sight),	
baṣīra.	Morality	could	not	be	 ‘seen’	or	detected	by	the	physical	 ‘eye’,	 that	can	only	
detect	 corporeal	 matters.	 Instead,	 since	 its	 nature,	 it	 could	 only	 be	 perceived	 by	
one’s	spiritual	disposition,	the	soul,	that	relates	to	God.	It	is	worthy	from	this	point	
to	highlight	the	existing	links	in	Sufism	between	aesthetics	and	morality,	perhaps	an	
appealing	area	of	research	that	requires	further	investigations.	
Al-Ghazālī	 presents	 another	 key	 definition	 of	 morality	 that	 was	 translated	 in	
Hamid	Reza	Alavi’s	paper	as	“A	stable	state	of	 the	soul”	(Alavi,	2007,	p.	313).	Yet	 I	
don’t	 find	this	 translation	to	be	adequate	 for	choosing	 the	three	words	 “stable”	 to	
translate	rāsikha	as	 I	 believe	 that	 ‘rooted’	 is	more	 accurate	 to	 translate	 the	word.	
‘Form’	is	more	accurate	than	‘state’	to	translate	hay’a,	and	‘self,	as	described	through	
the	paper,	 is	more	 appropriate	 than	 ‘soul’	 to	 translate	nafs.	My	 translation	 for	his	
essential	 definition	 of	morality	would	be	 “A	 form	 that	 is	 rooted	 in	 the	 self	 (nafs)”	
(RRS,	p.	84).	
He	continues	to	describe	that	from	this	‘rooted	form’:		
“…actions	 are	 made	 easily	 and	 effortlessly	without	 the	 need	 of	 thought	 or	
calculation…	because	he	who	puts	an	effort	to	spend	money	or	become	silent	
when	in	anger	with	effort	and	calculation,	he	cannot	be	described	to	have	the	
virtues	of	generosity	and	patience/tolerance”	(RRS,	p.	84)	
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Both	definitions,	 especially	 the	 second	one,	 already	assume	 the	 strong	 ties	 be-
tween	Sufism	and	VE.	Both	have	 the	 ‘character’	 as	 focal	 to	morality	and	 it	 is	 clear	
from	the	second	definition	how	it	exactly	describes	the	VE	view.	
Al-Ghazālī	 considers	 four	 cardinal	virtues	 to	 be:	wisdom,	bravery,	 temperance,	
and	 justice,	 these	 same	virtues	appear	 in	Plato’s	Republic	 (Parry,	1996,	p.	38).	All	
other	 virtues,	 according	 to	 al-Ghazālī,	 branch	 out	 from	 these	 cardinal	 ones.	 He	
claims	that	only	the	prophet	reached	perfection	in	moderation	regarding	these	four	
virtues	 (RRS,	 p.	 87).	We	 have	 previously	 explored	 in	 depth	 the	 virtues	 of	 bravery	
and	temperance	since	they	are	directly	linked	with	the	thesis’	main	theme,	as	their	
attainment	is	a	direct	manifestation	of	slaying	the	ego.	As	for	wisdom,	defined	by	al-
Ghazālī	 as	 the	awareness	of	distinguishing	 right	 from	wrong	actions,	 it	 too	has	an	
underlying	 potency	 that	 needs	 to	 reach	moderation	 for	 this	 virtue	 to	 be	 attained.	
This	potency	is	 ‘knowledge’	(‘ilm)	potency.	Justice,	however,	is	the	only	trait	that	is	
referred	to	by	al-Ghazālī	as	a	 ‘potency’	and	as	a	 ‘virtue’.	He	 clarified	 that	 justice	 is	
used	to	restrain	and	adjust	the	other	potencies	of	anger	and	temptation	under	the	
command	of	the	intellect	and	al-shar’	(RRS,	p.	86).	
It	is	sufficient	for	this	part	to	present	the	general	view	of	morality	and	virtue	ac-
cording	to	al-Ghazālī.	 In	 the	 coming	 section,	we	will	bring	an	 in-depth	analysis	on	
the	vices,	which	their	removal	is	requisite	for	slaying	the	ego	and	reaching	al-nafs	al-
muṭma’inna.	
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A	Map	of	the	Vices	
Al-Ghazālī	dedicates	almost	a	quarter	of	his	books	in	Iḥyā’	‘Ulūm	al-Dīn	to	giving	
detailed	accounts	on	the	vices	of	 the	ego.	In	his	book	forty	 foundations	of	religion,	
which	is	a	summary	of	Iḥyā’	‘Ulūm	al-Dīn,	he	clustered	the	vices	he	explained	in	Iḥyā’	
to	ten.	Three	other	vices	of	the	heart	were	mentioned	by	Ahmad	Ibn	Zayn	al-Ḥabashī	
(d.1733)9	in	 his	 book	 “Risalat	 al-Jami’a”	 (The	 Encompassing	 Epistle)	 (Al-Hanshi,	
2016)10.	He	added	1)	having	doubt	in	Allah,	2)	feeling	safe	from	His	punishment,	and	
3)	having	despair	from	His	mercy.	
These	three	vices	have	direct	ties	with	Quranic	verses	(add	references),	but	it	is	
unclear	whether	they	fit	with	al-Ghazālī’s	framework	since	they	seem	to	stem	from	
the	rooted	vices	mentioned	by	al-Ghazālī.	This	is	because,	I	claim,	that	they	are	the	
effects	 not	 the	cause	 of	 an	 impure	heart.	Hence	we	should	not	 include	 these	 three	
vices	to	our	analyses.	
I	will	split	two	of	these	ten	vices	into	two	making	them	twelve	vices	in	total,	for	
reasons	that	I	will	come	to	explain.	The	ordering	of	the	vices	is	an	attempt	to	group	
them	 together	according	 to	 the	main	potency	 that	 is	 related	 to	 the	 corresponding	
core	 vice,	 yet	 this	 doesn’t	 suggest	 any	 exclusivity	 between	 the	 vices	 and	 their	 re-
spective	groups	as	all	the	vices	are	believed	to	be	intertwined	with	one	another.	The	
first	group	matches	the	vices	that	are	close	to	lack	of	regulation	of	anger,	while	the	
second	group	brings	the	vices	that	are	close	to	lack	of	regulation	of	temptation.	
                                                
9	Imam	Ahmad	was	one	of	the	main	students	of	Abdallah	Ibn	‘Alawī	al-Ḥaddād	(d.1720)	who	is	believed	to	be	
the	spiritual	renewer	(mujaddid)	of	the	twelfth	Islamic	century	and	a	direct	descendent	of	the	prophet		
10	Risalat	al-Jami’a	is	considered	to	be	a	summary	of	a	summary	of	a	summary	of	al-Ghazālī’s	Iḥyā’	‘Ulūm	al-Dīn	
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The	12	vices	are:	
• Lack of regulation of anger 
o Pride and arrogance (kibr wa ghurūr) 
o Self Admiration (‘ujb) 
o Jealousy (ḥiqd wa ḥasad) 
o Stinginess (bukhl) 
• Lack of regulation of temptation 
o Food and sexual desires (kasr al shahwatayn) 
o Love of world (ḥub al-dunya) 
o Love for wealth (ḥub al-māl) 
o Love of status and fame (ḥub al-jāh) 
o Ostentation (Riyā’) 
o Vices of the tongue (āfāt al-lisān) 
 
As	discussed	previously	the	vices	are	directly	tied	to	the	ego,	which	only	exists	as	
a	result	of	imbalances	of	the	anger	and	temptation	potencies.	There	is	no	mention	of	
other	root	vices	that	could	be	found	elsewhere	in	the	nafs	other	than	these	accord-
ing	to	al-Ghazālī’s	classification.	 I	have	rearranged	their	order	 in	a	way	that	aligns	
with	the	themes	suggested	throughout	the	thesis.	We	could	think	of	a	couple	of	vices	
that	 could	 seemingly	 not	 fit	 such	 outline,	 yet	 here	 are	 a	 couple	 of	 examples	 that	
would	 demonstrate	 how	 they	would	 still	 be	 linked	 to	 these	 fundamental	 vices.	 A	
vice	such	as	cowardice	is	considered	to	be	the	lack	of	bravery	(Aristotle,	1998,	Book	
II:	8),	and	al-Ghazālī	stated	that	the	regulation	of	the	potency	of	anger	leads	to	the	
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attainment	of	the	virtue	of	bravery,	as	mentioned	earlier.	Therefore,	the	vice	of	cow-
ardice	is	rooted	in	the	lack	of	regulation	of	anger,	which	is	exhibited	in	the	map.	An-
other	vice	that	we	could	try	out	is	‘absence	of	modesty/shyness’	(haiya’),	this	could	
be	rooted	in	the	vice	of	love	of	dunya	where	the	person	becomes	lustful	and	proud	of	
attaining	worldly	pleasures	of	which	is	justified	by	the	love	of	this	world.	
Al-Ghazālī	considers	the	lack	of	regulation	of	anger	as	a	vice	of	its	own,	but	didn’t	
consider	lack	of	regulation	of	temptation	to	be	a	vice	of	its	own	and	did	not	give	any	
account	on	this	vice	or	concept.	Instead	he	primarily	addressed	food	and	sexual	de-
sires	 as	 the	 direct	manifestation	 of	 lack	 of	 regulation	 of	 temptation.	 Yet	 again,	 he	
didn’t	address	lack	of	regulation	of	 temptation	in	the	same	way	he	did	with	anger.	
This	was	the	main	alteration	of	my	 two	amendments	to	 the	map,	 that	 I	 added	the	
vice	of	lack	of	regulation	of	temptation	as	to	balance	the	one	with	the	lack	of	regula-
tion	of	anger.	Similar	to	considering	anger	as	a	disposition	that	needs	regulation	and	
not	 to	be	purged,	 temptation	belongs	to	the	same	concept.	 It	 is	not	 the	case	that	a	
human	should	not	experience	enjoyment	or	have	desires	for	objects,	but	in	fact	it	is	
the	case	that	such	pleasures	should	aid	one	to	reach	closer	and	higher	stations	with	
Allah	and	that	one	would	be	able	to	desire	his	Lord	and	His	closeness.	It	is	problem-
atic	when	the	desires	and	temptation	are	exercised	on	things	other	than	for	the	sake	
of	Allah,	but	that	is	not	the	problem	of	temptation	but	it	is	the	problem	of	the	sub-
ject.	That	is	to	say	that	temptation	as	a	disposition,	just	like	anger,	needs	regulation	
not	eradication	(SA,	p.	90).	
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These	two	vices	are	each	considered	as	vices	of	 their	own,	rather	than	only	re-
ferring	 to	 them	 as	 the	main	 potencies	 that	 are	 combined	 and	 form	 the	 ego.	From	
this,	for	the	sake	of	clarification	and	ease,	I	have	been	inclined	to	cluster	the	vices	to	
‘potency’	and	‘core’	vices.	
The	potency	vices	are	the	vices	of	lack	of	regulation	of	anger,	and	lack	of	regula-
tion	of	temptation.	The	core	vices	influence	these	potency	vices.	Also	the	core	vices	
are	 the	 cause	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 potency	 vices.	 But	 even	 if	 the	 potency	 vices	
seem	to	be	regulated,	the	core	vices	would	still	need	to	be	fixed	as	they	contain	the	
real	and	hidden	vices	of	 the	heart.	It	could	be	stated	that	the	core	vices	are	vices	of	
the	heart	and	the	potency	vices	are	the	vices	of	the	ego.	This	means	that,	as	al-Ghazālī	
mentioned,	the	ego	is	where	the	potencies	of	anger	and	temptation	reside.	Where	do	
the	core	vices	reside	then?	These	core	vices	are	not	descriptive	of	but	are	still	linked	
to	 anger	 and	 temptation.	 This	 leaves	 us	with	 an	 important	 critical	 finding	 that	 is	
slaying	the	ego,	which	is	achieving	moderation	of	 its	 two	main	potencies,	can	only	
happen	through	fixing	the	vices	of	the	heart.	We	could	think	of	it	in	this	way:	an	ill	
person	has	his	temperature	rise,	and	all	what	the	doctor	would	care	about	is	reduc-
ing	this	temperature	back	to	normal	and	not	performing	full	diagnosis	in	an	attempt	
to	 identify	 the	 reason	behind	 the	temperature	rise.	 Is	 this	doctor	 really	 curing	the	
diseased	man?	Or	is	he	just	containing	the	symptoms?	
Similarly	we	could	think	of	the	potency	and	core	vices	in	the	same	way.	The	po-
tency	vices	are	the	symptoms	of	the	core	vices.	It	is	important	to	note	that	both	need	
treatment,	 like	 the	 doctor	wouldn’t	 ignore	 the	 temperature	 rise	 and	would	 try	 to	
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treat	 the	 patient	 for	 the	 underlying	 disease.	 The	 doctor	 however	 should	 treat	 the	
temperature	rise	and	treat	the	underlying	disease	as	well.	Analogously,	treatment	of	
the	 potency	vices	 should	 not	 be	 sufficient	 for	 the	 full	 treatment	 of	 the	 core	 vices.	
That	is	exactly	why	I	believe	it	is	important	to	address	the	potency	vices	along	with	
the	core	vices	when	it	comes	to	slaying	the	ego,	which	is	what	Ghazālī	does	through-
out	Iḥyā’.	It	is	not	going	to	be	sufficient	to	deal	with	the	core	vices	alone	and	neglect	
the	potency	vices	or	assume	that	they	will	be	fixed	on	their	own.	The	account	of	the	
12	mentioned	vices	hence	are	very	 important	 to	be	done	altogether,	 regardless	of	
the	strategy	of	the	treatment,	in	order	to	achieve	the	slaying	of	the	ego.	It	could	be	
drawn	that	the	vices	of	the	heart	causes	the	vices	of	the	ego	that	causes	the	vices	of	
the	body.	The	vices	of	the	ego	are	symptomatic	to	the	vices	of	the	heart,	and	the	vices	
of	the	body	are	symptomatic	to	the	vices	of	the	ego.	That	doesn’t	eliminate	the	possi-
bility	of	a	dual	 influence	between	the	heart	and	the	ego,	where	the	heart	 could	be	
‘contaminated’	by	the	ego,	or	even	the	body.	A	diagram	will	explore	these	relations	
in	the	conclusion	section.	
So	 resolving	the	potency	vices	would	be	 insufficient	 to	reach	moderation	of	 the	
potencies	of	the	ego.	This	is	a	clear	distinguishing	element	(the	core	vices	and	its	re-
lation	 to	 the	 moderation	 of	 the	 potencies)	 and	 a	 contribution	 that	 highlights	 the	
richness	of	Sufism’s	account	of	virtue	and	moderation	from	any	other	tradition.	
Al-Ghazālī	states	that	anger	is	the	result	of	the	deprivation	of	what	is	loved	by	a	
person,	meaning	that	a	person	feels	anger	when	they	lose	what	they	love,	and	that	it	
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should	only	be	permissible	in	a	way	that	aligns	with	the	intellect	and	the	Islamic	law	
(shari’a)	in	two	scenarios:		
(1)	When	deprivation	of	 the	basic	necessities	of	 the	person	occurs;	 such	as	
food,	shelter,	clothes,	and	health		
(2)	When	deprivation	of	 some	necessities	of	 the	person	occurs	 that	 is	rele-
vant	to	their	context:	such	as	a	book	for	a	scholar	or	tools	for	merchant	(RRS,	
p.	271).	
	
However	it	is	not	at	all	permissible	to	allow	anger	for	lacking	things	that	are	un-
necessary	for	all	humans:	such	as	status,	fame,	wealth,	etc.	The	solution	in	this	case	
according	to	al-Ghazālī	 is	 to	remove	the	 love	 for	 these	things,	which	suggests	how	
the	 core	vices	are	 intertwined	and	are	essential	 to	 reaching	 regulation	 for	 the	po-
tency	vices	and	the	whole	potencies.	
It	 is	 also	 critical	 to	note	 that	 the	 recovery	 from	the	 core	vices	 could	not	be	at-
tained	by	applying	the	principle	of	the	golden	mean	as	it	only	applies	to	the	potency	
vices,	that	is	because	the	core	vices	are	direct	manifestations	of	excessiveness	or	defi-
ciencies	of	Sufi	Virtue,	hence	moderation	cannot	be	applied	to	the	vices	themselves.	
For	example,	there	is	no	moderation	to	love	of	wealth.	It	is	a	vice	that	needs	direct	
removal	because	it	will	always	be	a	vice	to	love	wealth,	and	it	can’t	be	perceived	that	
one	should	love	wealth	less	or	love	wealth	in	moderation.	In	Sufism,	moderation	is	
the	complete	removal	of	the	love	of	wealth.	
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The	same	thing	applies	 to	pride,	as	 the	prophet	said,	 “He	who	possesses	at	his	
heart	 the	weight	of	one	atom	of	pride	will	not	enter	heaven	 (Jannah)”.	This	direct	
and	clear	 command	 is	 to	 completely	and	critically	 remove	pride	 from	one’s	heart.	
This	does	not	mean	that	a	virtuous	person	cannot	become	wealthy	or	cannot	be	fa-
mous	since	these	vices	are	concerned	with	the	heart	and	it	is	only	the	love	and	long-
ing	for	these	matters	that	is	considered	to	be	immoral.	
Same	thing	applies	to	the	 love	of	dunyā.	Where	it	might	be	misunderstood	that	
Sufism	endorses	monasticism;	being	in	isolation	of	worldly	activities	and	being	de-
voted	 in	 spiritual	 exertions	 that	 is	 found	 in	 Christianity	 in	 Catholic	 and	Orthodox	
traditions	as	well	as	Buddhism	and	Hinduism,	this	could	be	confused	as	the	 ‘go-to’	
notion	as	to	avoid	from	the	vice	of	loving	dunyā.	In	Sufism	communal	work,	service,	
and	engagement	are	integral	to	one’s	duties	and	spiritual	journeying	(sulūk)	as	the	
path	 towards	 moral	 perfection	 is	 not	 found	 in	 withdrawal	 from	 society	 (Bucar,	
2018,	p.	214).	While	the	isolation	and	demise	of	attachment	to	dunya	is	the	only	re-
quired	notion	to	be	applied	to	 the	heart	of	 the	murīd	 not	 to	his	physical	practices.	
The	murīd	 is	 encouraged	 to	actively	engage	with	 the	 society	 and	worldly	dealings	
like	trading,	fighting	injustice,	helping	the	needy,	etc.	While	it	is	undeniable	that	iso-
lation,	 ‘uzlia,	 is	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 the	 path,	 it	 is	 understood	 that	 isolation	 is	 not	
where	that	path	ends	but	rather	its	one	of	the	means	and	practices	that	is	needed	for	
the	murīd	to	be	able	to	advance	in	his	path.	Hence,	we	can	understand	that	isolation,	
when	done,	is	temporary	and	aims	to	have	a	certain	effect	on	the	murīd,	not	offer	a	
lasting	sanction	to	him.	
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The	love	of	wealth	and	stinginess	were	categorized	by	al-Ghazālī	as	one	vice	in	
the	book	of	forty,	but	I	chose	to	split	them	into	two	separate	vices	as	to	match	love	
of	wealth	with	temptation	related	vices	and	stinginess	with	(cowardice)	anger	relat-
ed	vices.	Love	wealth	is	drawn	near	to	temptation	potency	since	the	vice	is	related	
to	the	love	of	possessions	and	desire	to	own	wealth.	al-Ghazālī	stated	that	generosi-
ty	 is	a	result	of	bravery11,	 that	 is	why	stinginess	 is	related	to	the	potency	of	anger	
since	anger	is	related	to	the	disposition	of	bravery,	as	discussed	earlier.	The	relation	
between	 stinginess	 and	 cowardice	 is	 found	 in	 one’s	 fear	 of	 poverty	 and	 fear	 of	
spending	as	to	lose	one’s	possessions	and	that	is	contradictory	to	the	belief	that	Al-
lah	is	the	bestower	of	properties,	money,	etc.	The	murīd	needs	to	have	the	bravery	
as	to	conquer	all	fears	except	the	fear	of	Allah.	
In	 Iḥyā’	he	also	talks	about	both	as	 two	separate	vices	yet	 they	share	the	same	
section	and	title	in	the	book,	which	makes	him	consider	them	both	as	a	sort	of	‘two	
faces	of	the	same	coin’	and	account	them	as	the	same	vice	in	his	summary,	forty.	
In	 sum,	 the	 way	 to	 ‘slay	 the	 ego’	 and	 reach	 al-nafs	 al-muṭma’inna	 is	 through	
achieving	regulation	of	the	two	potency	vices	and	removal	of	the	10	core	vices.		
This	may	be	presented	as	follows:	
 
Purification	from	core	vices	and	regulation	of	potency	vices	à	Moderation	of	
potencies	in	ego	=	Slaying	of	the	ego	=	Al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	à	Readiness	to	
adorning	of	Godly	virtues	à	Sufi	Virtue			
                                                
11	al-Ghazālī,	“Iḥyā’	‘Ulūm	al-Dīn”,	p.	87	
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Al-Ghazālī	 suggests	 ‘remedies’	 and	ways	 to	 cure	 from	 all	 the	mentioned	 vices,	
except	for	lack	of	regulation	of	temptation	since	he	didn’t	identify	it	as	a	vice	of	its	
own.	They	mainly	involve	contemplation	(fikr),	remembrance	(dhikr),	and	physical	
practice	 (‘amal).	 It	 could	 be	 conceptualized	 that	 these	 tools	 are	 directed	 from	 the	
rational	part	of	the	nafs	(self)	to	the	irrational	(ego).	Fikr	 is	where	the	murīd	needs	
to	contemplate	and	challenge	intellectually	certain	notions,	some	that	might	by	ex-
hibited	by	the	ego,	in	such	way	the	murīd	can	fix	the	respective	vice	by	engaging	in	a	
thought	 process.	 Like	 conversing	 with	 a	 child,	 a	 theme	 that	 often	 occurs	 by	 Sufi	
preachers	who	 resemble	 the	nafs	 (ego)	as	a	 child,	when	acting	and	behaving	 irra-
tionally	but	needs	rational	and	wise	intervention	by	his	caretaker.	Reason	and	justi-
fication	are	practiced	using	fikr	that	potentially	influences	the	behavior	and	the	ac-
tivity	 of	 the	 ego.	 This	 resembles	 the	 modernly	 known	 psychotherapy	 treatment,	
Cognitive	Behavioral	Therapy,	which	aims	to	challenge	and	alter	 thinking	patterns	
as	well	as	core	beliefs	that	influence	the	subject’s	behavior	and	attitude12.	A	demon-
stration	of	that	is	part	of	al-Ghazālī’s	contemplative	solution	on	the	vice	of	‘ujub:	
“Intelligence	 demands	 that	 one	 remains	 grateful	 to	 Allah	 for	 His	 bounties,	
and	he	should	understand	that	it	is	Allah's	great	favour	that	He	has	bestowed	
so	much	of	His	Kindness	upon	us	initially,	whereas	we	were	undeserving.	He	
should	realize	that	he	has	been	granted	the	bounty	of	knowledge	and	intelli-
gence,	in	front	of	which	wealth	has	no	reality.	Thereafter	Allah	even	granted	
                                                
12	Wells,	Adrian	and	Peter	Fisher.	Treating	Depression:	MCT,	CBT,	and	Third	Wave	Therapies.	West	Sussex,	Eng-
land:	Wiley	Blackwell,	2016;2015;.	–	p	236	
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one	 the	 favour	 of	worshipping	 Him	 and	 thanking	Him,	whereas	 others	 are	
deprived	of	 this;	 and	 this	deprivation	was	not	due	 to	 some	previous	 sin	or	
the	 recompense	 of	 some	 weakness.	 When	 one	 continuously	 ponders	 over	
this,	 then	Divine	Fear	will	be	created.	One	will	realize	that	 if	the	Being	who	
granted	me	His	Bounties,	without	me	being	deserving	of	them,	snatches	them	
away	without	any	cause	or	sin,	then	what	right	do	I	have	to	complain?	What	
will	 I	do	 if	 these	 bounties	 upon	me	 are	 only	 temporary	and	 deceiving,	 and	
will	eventually	lead	to	punishment	and	harm	to	my	life?”	(FFR,	p.	115)		
 
Dhikr	 is	 important	 too	 in	 Sufism	since	 it	 acts	 like	a	 spiritual	practice	 that	pro-
vides	 the	murīd	with	 spiritual	 aid	needed	 in	 overcoming	 the	vices.	Dhikr	 could	be	
interpreted	as	the	remembrance	of	the	abovementioned	related	fikr	and	intellectual	
concepts,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 affirmations	 given	 to	 the	 self.	 This	 technique	 is	 also	 en-
couraged	within	 the	 framework	of	modern	psychology	 that	 links	 ‘self-affirmations	
with	the	subject’s	attitude	and	wellbeing	(Howell,	2017).	Dhikr	also	means	the	reci-
tation	of	spiritual	texts	like	Quran,	prophetic	prayers,	names	of	Allah,	etc.	each	hav-
ing	its	own	spiritual	reality	and	effect	on	the	murīd’s	state	and	nafs.	This	could	also,	
but	not	necessarily,	 include	 the	 remembrance	of	 the	abovementioned	 fikr	 through	
such	recitations.	
An	important	element	for	the	attainment	of	virtue	and	good	habit	is	‘amal.	
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“To	acquire	virtue,	man	must	practice	good	deeds	so	that	they	become	habits	
for	him…	In	order	to	be	just	for	example,	one	must	first	behave	in	a	just	man-
ner”	(Sherif,	1975,	p.	33).	
It	resembles	the	ascetic	exercises	that	help	in	disciplining	the	ego	and	forming	its	
tendencies	by	either	engaging	in	abstention	or	consumption	depending	on	the	state	
of	the	murīd.	This	will	be	further	elaborated	in	the	coming	section.	
 
The	Heart	and	Jawāriḥ	
Al-Ghazālī	 points	 out	 a	 duality	 between	 the	 physical	 limbs	 and	 the	 tongue	
(jawāriḥ)	 and	 the	 heart	 (RRS,	 p.	 94).	 This	 could	 be	 understood	 as	 addressing	 the	
heart	 in	 its	metaphysical	 manner	 as	 explained	 earlier,	 metaphorically	 addressing	
the	tongue	referring	to	what	it	utters	(speech),	and	physically	addressing	the	rest	of	
the	limbs.	This	dual	link	expresses	that	engaging	with	effort	in	the	acts	of	jawāriḥ	at	
the	beginning	could	lead	one	to	obtain	or	adjust	an	internal	disposition	or	virtue	at	
the	heart.	Then,	however	the	internal	disposition	becomes,	it	effortlessly	influences	
the	actions	of	 the	 jawāriḥ	 and	 is	 always	produced	out	of	 this	disposition	or	virtue	
(SA,	p.	97).	This	is	in	alignment	with	the	notion	of	Islamic	commands	and	teachings	
that	very	critically	consider	and	account	for	harmonious	adjustments	of	body,	intel-
lect,	and	heart	as	 to	reach	union	with	God.	This	 tripartite	classification	 is	 tied	to	a	
famous	Hadith,	where	 the	angel	Gabriel	demonstrated	the	 spiritual	 reality	of	such	
classification	through	his	conversation	with	the	prophet	(Chittick,	2009,	p.	4).	This	is	
to	highlight	 the	presence	of	 the	 link	between	 the	actions	of	 the	physical	body	and	
one’s	spiritual	state	since	the	divine	command	that	requires	attunement	of	the	body,	
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as	well	as	 the	 intellect	 and	heart.	This	will	be	 further	 illustrated	 in	 the	conclusion	
section.	
	
I	would	argue	that	the	phase	where	the	murīd	commits	to	doing	the	moral	action	
by	 jawāriḥ	even	if	not	yet	linked	by	the	heart	 is	 the	same	phase	of	slaying	the	ego	
where	the	murīd	tries	to	influence	his	internal	disposition	and	heart	by	engaging	in	
physical	practices	that	challenges	such	disposition	that	might	be	void	of	meanings	of	
devotion	and	 love.	That	 is	because	worship	out	of	devotion	and	love	belong	to	the	
highest	ranks	a	person	could	reach.		
 
Examining	the	Moral	Subject’s	Motivation	
In	 Sufism,	 there	 are	 three	main	motives	 for	worshipping	 Allah.	 This	 threefold	
definition	 of	 the	 states	 of	 the	 intention	 is	 attributed	 to	 the	 early	 Sufi	 Ma`ruf	 al-
Karkhi	 (d.	 815)	 by	 Shaykh	 `Abd	 al-Rahman	 al-Sufuri	 (d.	 1488)	 in	 his	 "Nuzhat	 al-
Majalis”	(Saffuri,	2013).	
The	 least	rank	of	worship	 is	 the	worship	of	 the	 slaves	 (‘abīd),	 and	that	 is	wor-
shipping	Allah	only	out	of	fear	of	His	hellfire.	A	higher	rank	of	worship	is	one	that	is	
of	the	merchants	(tujjār),	and	that	is	the	worship	of	Allah	due	to	desire	of	something	
jawāriḥ 	Heart	
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in	return	of	the	worship	like	paradise	or	any	other	pleasure.	The	third	and	highest	
rank	of	worship	is	the	one	that	is	of	the	free	(aḥrār),	and	that	is	the	worship	of	Allah	
for	 the	sake	of	Allah	and	 is	pure	 from	any	other	motivation.	The	Sufis	believe	that	
only	the	third	type	is	a	moral	type	of	worship.	However,	the	first	two	types	are	still	
aligned	with	sharia’a	and	grant	the	individual	a	place	in	heaven.	This	makes	a	clarifi-
cation	that	Allah	grants	heaven	for	the	three	types	yet	holds	different	ranks	between	
the	 three.	Even	 if	 the	 first	 two	 types	are	considered	 to	be	 immoral,	 they	are	suffi-
cient	 for	 entering	 paradise.	 One	 of	 the	most	 famous	 Sufi	 female	 saints,	 Rābi‘a	 al-
‘Adawiyya	(d.	801)	famously	wrote:	
 
"O	Lord,	if	I	worship	You	because	of	Fear	of	Hell, 
then	burn	me	in	Hell;	
If	I	worship	You	because	I	desire	Paradise, 
then	exclude	me	from	Paradise;	
But	if	I	worship	You	for	Yourself	alone, 
then	deny	me	not	your	Eternal	Beauty”	(Barnstone	and	Barnstone,	1992)	
 
I	 would	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 normal	 for	 a	murīd	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 his	 journey	 to	
commit	to	worship	of	Allah	for	the	 first	 two	reasons,	and	that	 is	appropriate	since	
the	murīd	 is	seeking	moral	excellence	and	if	he	had	already	reached	the	highest	of	
ranks	in	worship	then	he	wouldn’t	need	to	learn	or	acquire	virtue	nor	get	rid	of	the	
vices.	My	argument	is	that	pleasure	and	pain	are	useful	tools	to	tame	the	ego	in	or-
der	 to	 slay	 it	 and	 reach	moral	 excellence.	 It	 is	not	 sensible	 that	one	 should	be	ex-
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pected	 to	experience	 sincere	 love	 for	Allah	when	the	person	 is	still	suffering	 from	
impurities	 in	 the	 heart.	Hence	when	 the	 ego	 is	 still	manifested	 in	 the	 person,	 the	
person	can	still	commit	to	worship	of	Allah	till	they	try	to	advance	in	their	spiritual	
rank.	The	only	way	for	the	murīd	to	maintain	such	commitment	given	the	manifesta-
tion	of	the	ego	in	him	is	through	pleasure	and	pain,	since	the	ego	would	not	be	able	
to	comprehend	the	pure	meanings	of	love,	as	these	meanings	are	only	to	be	received	
by	the	purified	self	and	heart.	Therefore	it	is	not	implausible	for	the	murīd	who	is	in	
combat	with	his	ego	to	use	pleasure	and	pain	as	short-term	motivations	in	his	spir-
itual	journey,	which	aims	to	reach	a	point	of	pure	level	of	selfless	worship	and	devo-
tion	to	Allah.		
Reaching	this	level	of	pure	selflessness	in	worship,	attributed	to	saints,	does	not	
imply	any	sort	of	doing	‘less’	of	God’s	divine	command,	if	any	it	would	imply	doing	
‘more’,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	 prophet.	 Given	 that	 he	 is	 believed	 by	 the	 Sufis	 to	
have	reached	human	perfection,	it	is	certainly	the	case	that	he	reached	perfection	in	
motivation	for	worship.	The	prophet	acknowledged	his	chief	rank	of	spirituality	and	
morality	and	 still	did	the	same	basic	worship	rituals	of	 the	 layman	and	 in	 fact	did	
extra	(than	the	necessary	rituals)	 types	of	worship.	This	clarifies	an	 important	no-
tion	of	whether	the	deontic	commands	in	Islam	are	followed	in	order	for	the	agent	
to	reach	virtue	or	is	virtue	found	in	following	such	commands?	
I	believe	that	it	is	both:	deontic	orders	leads	to	the	attainment	of	virtue	as	well	as	
knowledge	and	union	with	God,	while	it	is	also	the	case	that	in	following	these	deon-
tic	commands	and	rituals	the	agent	is	being	virtuous	by	knowing,	submitting	and	fol-
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lowing	God’s	will.	This	retells	the	initial	claim	presented	in	this	thesis	of	the	unique	
blend	 that	 Sufism	 achieves	 between	 deontology	 and	VE.	 If	 it	 was	 the	 case	 that	 at	
some	point	divine	rituals	are	no	longer	necessary	for	the	agent	who	reached	virtue,	
like	praying	for	example,	then	the	prophet	would	have	stopped	doing	it.	It	might	be	
the	 case	 however	 for	 some	 ‘extra’	 ascetic	 practices	 that	 are	 not	 obligatory	 for	all	
Muslims	to	follow	and	were	assigned	for	the	agent	to	overcome	certain	vices	to	be	no	
longer	 relevant	 to	 the	 agent	 who	 already	 reached	 that	 practice’s	 objective.	 This	
elaborates	greatly	that	in	Sufism	one	must	follow	the	deontic	commands	and	attain	
virtue	through	flourishing	their	character,	self,	and	soul.		
 
Selfish	and	Selfless	Dialectic		
This	 takes	us	 to	another	 important	 tension	that	 this	 thesis	could	be	able	 to	re-
solve	regarding	the	problematic	distinction	between	selfless	and	selfish	motivations.	
The	dilemma	usually	revolves	around	the	same	mentioned	point	regarding	the	mor-
al	worth	of	the	motivation	behind	the	action.	For	example,	we	can	ask	is	it	moral	to	
serve	others	 for	 the	sake	of	seeking	a	pleasurable	outcome	and	feeling	good	about	
ourselves?	Does	this	make	the	action	moral?	Or	when	we	help	others	 just	to	avoid	
feeling	 bad	 about	 ourselves,	 is	 this	 considered	 to	 be	 a	moral	 intention?	Most	 im-
portantly	we	should	ask,	is	it	even	possible	to	do	any	kind	of	action	without	any	sort	
of	 personal	 gain?	 Because	 it	 seems	 like	 even	when	 someone	 is	motivated	 to	 help	
others	without	wanting	anything	in	return,	they	are	doing	so	because	they	‘want’	to	
be	good	and	do	the	right	thing.	Doesn’t	this	too	count	as	a	selfish	intention?	
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I	believe	that	using	al-Ghazālī’s	distinction	of	al	nafs	could	bring	this	perplexity	
to	rest.	I	first	argue	that	for	the	human	condition,	having	a	motivation	presupposes	
either	a	need	to	be	fulfilled	or	a	goal	to	be	reached,	or	both.	 In	either	case,	the	hu-
man	is	in	a	state	of	need	and	aims	to	move	to	a	state	of	fulfillment.	This	means	that	it	
is	never	the	case	that	a	human	could	have	a	motivation	to	act	without	any	sort	of	de-
sire	to	attain	fulfillment	behind	such	action.	Hence	we	shall	explore	the	two	different	
possible	understandings	of	‘selfish’	motivations:	serving	the	ego	vs.	serving	the	self.	
We	might	want	to	consider	the	difference	between	(a)	someone	wanting	to	help	
others	just	so	the	person	could	increase	their	reputation	and	status	among	people,	
and	(b)	someone	who	wants	to	help	others	for	the	sake	of	spreading	goodness	that	
will	cause	the	person	to	feel	good	as	he	would	feel	that	he	has	done	the	right	thing.	It	
is	not	sensible	 to	judge	both	as	acting	upon	‘selfish’	motivations.	It	is	clear	that	for	
the	first	scenario	the	person	is	driven	by	a	selfish	motivation.	We	might	say	that	this	
person	 is	 serving	 their	 nafs,	 the	 ‘ego’	 part,	 as	 the	 person	 is	 consciously	 seeking	
praise	and	cares	 for	 fame	and	status.	As	 for	 the	 second	scenario,	 it	 is	not	 that	 the	
person	is	serving	his	nafs	but	rather	he	is	serving	a	cause	that	his	nafs,	the	‘self’	part,	
is	gaining	something	out	of	and	benefiting	from	this	positive	impact	and	exchange	of	
goodness.	We	cannot	say	that	the	person	is	selfish	because	his	‘self’	part	of	the	nafs	
is	 gaining	 something	 since	 it	 could	 be	argued	 from	 the	previously	mentioned	sec-
tions	that	the	gain	of	the	‘self’	is	the	loss	of	the	‘ego’.	Meaning	that	the	self	is	always	
in	a	state	of	progression	in	relation	to	the	slaying	of	its	ego,	which	is	in	the	nature	of	
the	self	that	it	lacks	perfection,	given	that	it	is	a	created	being,	to	seek	perfection	by	
uniting	with	 the	 only	 perfect	 being,	 God.	 So	 it	 is	 not	 immoral	 for	 the	 self	 to	need	
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seeking	union	with	God,	in	fact	it	is	its	genuine	purpose	that	it	needs	to	fulfill.	In	ac-
tual	fact,	what	could	be	argued	as	immoral	from	the	Sufi	paradigm	is	claiming	or	as-
suming	 that	 a	 self	 is	 not	 in	 need	 of	 its	 Lord.	 
	
 
“O	 people,	 it	 is	 you	 surely	who	 are	 in	 need	 of	 Allah,	 and	 Allah	 is	 the	 self-
sufficient,	immensely	praiseworthy”	[35:15]	
	
“As	 for	 he	who	was	 a	miser	 and	 thought	 himself	 self-sufficient.	 And	 disbe-
lieved	in	goodness.	Surely	We	will	ease	him	towards	difficulty”	[92:8-10]	
 
For	a	murīd	to	assume	that	they	should	deny	their	needs	of	the	‘self’	is	assuming	
that	they	are	self-sufficient	in	the	respective	issue,	and	that	is	an	exclusive	property	
of	God.	The	sufficiency	comes	for	a	murīd	by	achieving	union	with	God,	i.e.	by	need-
ing	God.	It	is	immoral	for	the	murīd	to	assume	that	they	do	not	need	God	in	any	as-
pect	of	their	lives:	in	obtaining	sustenance,	knowledge,	good	health,	etc.	Even	when	
in	sickness	the	murīd	shouldn’t	assume	that	the	medication	he	is	taking	has	any	in-
trinsic	power	of	healing,	but	rather	should	believe	that	the	healing	comes	only	from	
Allah.	More	details	on	this	view	could	be	found	in	al-Ghazālī’s	account	of	occasiona-
lism	(IP).	
This	explains	the	reality	for	the	moral	subject	in	Sufism	that	presents	the	murīd	
as	a	seeker	of	Allah,	setting	the	whole	spiritual	journey	to	find	and	know	God,	some-
thing	which	the	murīd’s	‘self’	intrinsically	wants	and	longs	for.	The	murīd	is	expected	
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to	become	selfless,	in	the	sense	of	losing	his	ego	and	prioritize	God’s	commands	and	
goodness	over	his	own	desires	of	the	ego.	
The	desires	of	the	ego	are	selfish,	the	longing	of	the	self	to	unite	with	God	is	self-
fulfilling,	 and	 the	way	 to	 reach	 so	 is	 to	 become	 selfless	 and	 have	 only	God	 as	 the	
moral	subject.	By	doing	so,	one	would	have	reached	excellence	in	terms	of	moral	in-
tentions	within	the	Sufi	context.	
One	could	question	whether	if	 it	 is	moral	to	‘use’	people	as	means	to	reach	an-
other	end,	which	is	God,	or	not.	For	the	Sufis,	I	would	argue	that	the	answer	would	
be	yes	and	no.	Yes,	as	disclosed	previously,	the	only	one	end	for	a	person	should	be	
to	know	God.	In	fact	having	multiplicity	in	the	ends	is	contradictory	to	declaration	of	
shahada	and	 appreciation	 of	 God’s	 oneness.	 And	 no	 because	 the	 framing	of	 ‘using	
people	as	means’	 could	connote	dehumanization	or	degradation	of	human’s	worth	
that	 is	degradation	of	God’s	 creation.	 It	could	be	 formulated	 in	a	different	way	 in-
stead	of	coining	terms	like	‘using	people’	or	‘using	God’s	creation’	to	know	God,	that	
it	becomes	‘knowing	people’	or	‘knowing	God’s	creation’	 to	know	God.	That	makes	
the	murīd’s	serventhood	for	others	an	extension	of	his	serventhood	to	God.	As	well	
as	his	serventhood	and	care	 for	all	creations,	animals	and	environment	too,	an	ex-
tension	of	his	gratitude	and	devotion	to	God.	
Therefore	as	a	conclusion,	it	is	worthy	to	highlight	the	problematic	choice	of	the	
terms	‘selfish’	and	‘selfless’	to	describe	the	discussed	meanings	as	they	both	refer	to	
what	 we	 defined	 as	 ‘ego’.	 It	 is	 as	 if	 we’re	 saying	 (selfish=egotistical),	 and	 (self-
less=non	egotistical).	
Page 68 of 86 
So	the	real	dialectic	is	between	ego-driven	motivations	and	non-ego	driven	mo-
tivations.	 It	could	never	be	the	case,	as	explained	earlier,	that	there	would	be	non-
self	driven	motivations;	hence	they	all	are	self-driven	but	not	necessarily	ego-driven.	
Relating	this	to	the	previously	mentioned	classification	of	the	ranks	of	worship,	
we	could	say	that	they	obtain	the	same	notion:	one	not	wanting	punishment	or	hell	
fire,	one	wanting	pleasure	or	heaven,	and	one	wanting	God.	The	three	forms	require	
the	self	to	‘want’	something	even	when	it	comes	to	what	the	Sufis	consider	as	moral	
‘want’,	it	is	still	a	‘want’	of	the	self.	My	argument	is	that	it	is	inescapable	for	the	self	
to	‘want’,	but	the	question	of	morality	comes	in	what	is	it	that	the	self	‘wants’.	
A	vital	remark	al-Ghazālī	makes	is	the	essential	role	that	the	moral	exemplar	au-
thority/spiritual	guide/mentor	(shaykh)	plays	in	the	solouk	of	the	murīd.	The	murīd	
needs	a	shaykh	in	order	to	advance	in	the	spiritual	path.	The	shaykh	in	Sufism	is	an	
essential	figure	to	spiritual	flourishing,	especially	that	the	shaykh	needs	to	be	part	of	
the	chain	(silsila)	that	is	linked	back	to	the	prophet	himself.	The	shaykh	offers	a	per-
sonal	guidance	and	a	spiritual	bond	with	the	murīd	that	helps	him	in	identifying	the	
obstacles	 that	 prevent	 him	 from	 progressing	 spiritually.	 The	 shaykh	 assigns	 the	
mentioned	tools	to	the	murīd	depending	on	his	judgment	and	knowledge	of	his	Hal	
(state).	Not	only	that	the	shaykh	directly	gives	guidance	to	the	murīd	through	these	
means,	but	also	the	shaykh	acts	as	a	moral	exemplar	where	the	murīd	is	able	to	learn	
by	observing	the	s	shaykh’s	behavior	and	attitude	with	other	individuals	and	when	
is	engaged	in	spiritual	practices	or	prayers.	There	is	great	emphasis	in	Sufism	in	the	
company	(suhba)	of	the	shaykh,	saints,	and	good	individuals.	
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This	takes	us	to	the	final	section	in	the	thesis	that	will	aim	to	draw	the	common-
alities	between	Sufism	and	Virtue	Ethics	where	we	will	 tie	 the	points	of	similitude	
from	what	was	disclosed	in	the	three	chapters.		
 
Moral	Exemplars		
As	we	just	discussed	the	importance	of	moral	exemplars	in	Sufism,	it	was	men-
tioned	 in	the	 first	chapter	also	that	moral	exemplars	are	essential	 in	VE	given	that	
this	 branch	 of	 ethics	 is	 centralized	 on	 the	 character;	 hence	 the	 exemplification	 of	
morals	must	be	through	a	virtuous	character.		
 
Duality	of	Rational	and	Irrational	Parts	of	the	Soul	
As	it	was	mentioned	the	main	theme	in	Sufism	regarding	the	ego	is	one’s	battle	
between	the	self	and	the	ego,	the	good	vs.	the	bad,	the	rational	vs.	the	irrational.	Ar-
istotle	too,	as	well	as	Plato,	have	classified	the	soul	to	these	main	two	parts	and	gave	
accounts	on	the	inner	conflict	between	them.	Highlighting	the	ties	between	morality	
and	the	conquest	of	the	rational	part.		
 
Moral	Education	and	Habituation	
Al-Ghazālī	often	mentions	in	Iḥyā’	that	virtues	are	learned	and	acquired	through	
practice	(ryadah)	and	that	habituation	is	successful	to	reaching	virtue.	Same	essen-
tial	notion	exists	in	VE	where	the	agent	habituates	the	character	to	become	virtuous	
especially	through	a	‘fake	it	till	you	make	it’	strategy.	al-Ghazālī	principally	adds	the	
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element	of	 ‘divine	assistance’	 as	a	necessary	condition	to	 the	effect	of	habituation,	
and	that	moral	education	would	be	impossible	without	it	(Attaran,	2015,	p.	49).	
 
Definition	of	Morality	
There	is	a	clear	resemblance	from	al-Ghazālī’s	definition	of	morality	with	VE	as	
he	noted	that	morality	is	within	one’s	nafs	and	from	it	actions	are	produced	effort-
lessly,	and	that	a	virtuous	character	emits	virtuous	actions.	That	is	surely	the	under-
lying	principle	of	VE.				
 
Principle	of	the	Golden	Mean		
“And	that	which	is	praised	is	the	middle,	and	that	is	virtue.	And	the	two	ends	
are	condemned	vices”	(RRS,	p.	86)	
 
As	we	have	 investigated	 throughout	 the	 thesis,	 al-Ghazālī	 clearly	makes	 use	of	
the	principle	of	the	golden	mean.	Which	is	one	of	the	known	doctrines	addressed	by	
classical	philosophers	and	mainly	Aristotle.	al-Ghazālī	also	brings	theological	refer-
ences	 to	 support	 such	 notion	 like	 the	 prophet’s	 saying	 “moderation	 is	 the	 best	 of	
things”	and	a	Quranic	verse	that	addresses	spending	in	moderation	after	mentioning	
the	two	extreme	vices	of	spending	and	stinginess.	
 
Eudaimonistic	Virtue	Ethic	
This	is	a	common	theme	between	Sufism	and	VE	that	 ‘happiness’	or	 fulfillment	
comes	with	one’s	 advancement	 towards	 their	purpose.	 In	Aristotelian	VE	 the	pur-
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pose	of	man	is	reaching	happiness,	eudaimonia,	while	in	Sufism	the	purpose	is	union	
and	knowledge	of	God.	If	we	bring	together	the	two	accounts,	it	is	not	implausible	to	
claim	 that	 true	 eudaimonia	 is	 reached	with	 union	with	 God.	 Eudaimonistic	 virtue	
expresses	that	moral	progress	 is	 impossible	unless	 the	agent	has	a	strong	unifying	
motivation	for	happiness	or	self-fulfillment.	Not	only	is	the	Sufi	driven	by	a	desire	to	
unite	with	God,	but,	from	a	Sufi	perspective,	this	desire	is	the	only	possible	motiva-
tion	sufficient	to	account	for	moral	progress.			
Promotion	of	Communal	Happiness	and	Wellness		
Another	common	theme	between	the	two	traditions	is	the	emphasis	on	commu-
nal	rather	than	individualistic	wellness.	Community	plays	an	integral	part	concern-
ing	the	attainment	of	virtue	in	both	traditions;	a	virtuous	person	demonstrates	care	
for	the	community	reaching	virtue	and	happiness.		
 
Asceticism		
As	 demonstrated	 earlier,	 the	 ascetic	 practices	 are	 found	 in	 both	 traditions	 re-
marking	a	great	commonality	between	them.	Asceticism	highlights	 the	role	of	self-
control	in	one’s	formation	of	virtues,	which	is	a	core	element	in	the	conflict	of	vice	
and	virtue	found	in	doing	the	right	thing	despite	feeling	otherwise	(Besong,	2019).	
This	is	has	been	greatly	used	by	Sufis	as	to	allow	the	slaying	of	the	ego	and	the	tam-
ing	of	its	potencies.	
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Importance	of	Intentions	and	Motivations		
Both	traditions	accept	that	the	intention	is	fundamental	in	evaluating	a	moral	ac-
tion.	The	intention	is	in	fact	more	important	than	the	apparent	action	for	the	virtu-
ous	character.	As	mentioned	in	the	first	chapter,	it	is	important	that	the	actions	that	
are	done	out	of	habit	are	not	‘mindless’	in	the	sense	that	they	don’t	engage	practical	
wisdom,	yet	could	mean	that	they	are	mindless	in	the	sense	of	not	requiring	struggle	
with	the	irrational	part	or	the	ego.		
	
Unity	not	Multiplicity	of	Goal	
Ending	with	 this	 interesting	 common	principle,	 Aristotle	advocates	 for	 the	 im-
portance	of	having	unity	not	multiplicity	of	a	goal.	It	is	evident	that	the	Sufis	share	
the	same	or	even	provide	deeper	accounts	of	unity	exhibited	in	the	goal	of	the	murīd	
as	well	as	other	ontological	views.	
 
Conclusion	
A	Conceptual	Model	of	the	Five	Human	Elements	
It	would	useful	to	put	together	a	conceptual	framework	that	illustrates	how	the	
parts	of	 the	self	 come	 together	 in	 the	 light	of	what	has	been	disclosed.	The	model	
illustrates	 the	 suggested	 links	 between	 the	 five	main	 spiritual	 components	 of	 the	
human	according	to	al-Ghazālī,	 those	are:	soul,	nafs,	 intellect,	heart,	and	body.	The	
diagram	could	be	expressed	in	three	formats,	in	alignment	with	the	previously	dis-
cussed	division	of	the	states	of	 the	self.	Those	three	versions	have	these	same	five	
parts,	except	that	the	changes	exist	in	the	nafs.	The	first	diagram	represents	al-nafs	
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al-muṭma’inna	suggesting	that	the	nafs	contains	only	the	self,	the	second	represents	
al-nafs	ammāra	b-il-sū’	suggesting	that	the	nafs	contains	only	the	ego,	and	the	third	
represents	al-nafs	al-lawwāma	 suggesting	 that	 the	nafs	 contains	both;	 the	 self	 and	
the	ego.	The	green	arrows	denote	pure	good	influence,	the	black	arrows	denote	pure	
bad	 influence,	 and	 the	 red	 arrows	 denote	 combat	 type	 of	 influence	 that	 could	 be	
good	or	bad.	The	 dotted	 line	 is	used	 once	 in	 the	model	 that	 illustrates	 the	 special	
link	between	the	soul	and	the	heart,	which	is	consistent	in	the	three	versions,	that	
explains	the	potential	direct	illumination	that	could	happen	to	the	heart	regardless	
of	the	state	of	the	self.	al-Ghazālī	addressed	this	light	as	being	directly	sent	from	Al-
lah	not	 from	the	soul,	as	the	model	might	convey,	yet	this	doesn’t	conflict	with	the	
model	as	the	model	is	still	suggesting	that	the	illumination	directly	comes	from	Allah	
and	merely	assumes	mystic	ties	between	the	soul	and	divine	revelation/speech,	all	
that	is	sent	and	facilitated	by	Allah.		
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Generally	the	model	suggests	that	 the	soul	 is	 the	only	part	that	only	sends	and	
doesn’t	receive	any	influence	from	the	other	parts.	Other	than	the	mentioned	special	
link	with	the	heart,	the	soul	mainly	 influences	the	nafs.	The	nafs	 is	in	mutual	influ-
ences	with	the	intellect,	the	body	and	the	heart.	The	intellect	doesn’t	directly	influ-
ence	the	body	or	the	heart	because	the	intellect	is	instrumental	and	needs	a	nafs	for	
it	 to	 function.	 That	 is	 why	 purification	 precedes	 rational	 knowledge	 in	 order	 and	
importance	in	Sufism;	the	nafs	that	is	putting	the	intellectual	faculty	into	use	needs	
to	be	cleansed	for	it	to	reach	the	truth.	Also	the	intellect	influences	the	body	through	
the	nafs,	this	justifies	why	the	intellect	would	want	the	body	to	behave	in	a	certain	
way	but	it	doesn’t,	and	that	is	due	to	the	resistance	or	the	disobedience	by	the	nafs.	
The	body	 is	hence	 respondent	 to	 the	nafs,	 nonetheless	 it	 can	 influence	 the	nafs	 in	
two	ways	 1)	 through	 bodily	 cravings	and	 desires	 or	2)	 through	 ascetic	 and	 pious	
practices.	 The	 model	 suggests	 another	 special	 direct	 relationship	 that	 was	 men-
tioned	 in	 earlier	 sections	 between	 the	 body	 and	 the	 heart,	 as	 referred	 to	 by	 al-
Ghazālī	in	his	demonstration	of	the	ties	between	jawāriḥ	and	the	heart.	The	final	re-
lation	 is	 the	one	between	 the	nafs	 and	 the	heart,	which	 is	 essential	 to	 capture	 the	
analyses	of	al-Ghazālī’s	description	of	 the	two	parts.	The	nafs,	ego	dominant,	could	
either	corrupt	 the	heart	and	cause	 it	 illness,	or	it	could	reach	purification	have	the	
heart	spread	its	good	and	virtuous	moral	intentions	and	actions.	It	within	the	ties	of	
the	 nafs	 and	 the	 heart	 where	 moral	 virtue	 is	 instilled	 and	 where	 two	 important	
Quranic	references	point	out	the	significance	of	both	parts	concerning	understand-
ing	the	assessment	of	morality;	“He	who	purifies	it	(nafs)	succeeds”	[91,9]	and	“Ex-
cept	Him	(who	will	be	saved)	who	brings	to	Allah	a	sound	and	pure	heart”	[26,89].	
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The	nafs	and	heart	are	focal	areas	for	morality	in	Sufism,	this	is	yet	another	common	
view	between	Sufism	and	VE	that	is	centered	on	the	character.		It	is	important	to	fi-
nally	highlight	that	the	only	version	where	all	the	parts	are	in	complete	harmony	is	
at	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna.		
 
Critical	Arguments	
In	 this	 section	 I	 aim	 to	 summarize	 the	main	 critical	 views	 and	 arguments	 dis-
cussed	in	the	thesis	in	the	same	order	they	were	unfolded.	
 
Explaining	Sufism	through	the	threefold	way	
We	presented	a	 threefold	view	 to	understand	Sufism,	which	highlighted	 its	 in-
clusion	of	 Islamic	theology,	philosophy,	and	 spirituality.	The	 three	domains,	as	ex-
plained	earlier,	work	together	and	bring	about	the	character	of	the	Sufi.		
 
Are	Humans	intrinsically	Good	or	Evil	or	Neither	in	Sufism?	
We	elaborated	that	in	Sufism,	the	notion	is	that	all	humans	are	intrinsically	good	
since	the	ties	between	the	soul,	self,	and	divine	blessing.	It	was	also	clarified	that	the	
ego,	is	the	source	of	all	evil	acts	exhibited	by	the	individual	or	within	a	community.	
Hence,	 humans	 are	 intrinsically	 good	 yet,	 they	 have	 an	 inner	 ‘evil	 force’	 that	 re-
quires	 slaying	and	purification	 as	 to	 flourish	 the	deeply	 rooted	 intrinsic	 nature	 of	
goodness	that	allows	knowledge	and	unity	with	the	divine,	which	is	man’s	sole	pur-
pose	of	existence.	
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The	Anatomy	of	the	Nafs	and	the	Ego	
Through	careful	exegetical	efforts	to	al-Ghazālī’s	beginning	chapter	of	Marvels	of	
the	Heart	of	 the	 Iḥyā’,	we	were	able	 to	properly	distinguish	between	 the	 two	dis-
closed	meanings	of	 the	nafs	that	allowed	us	 to	understand	 the	difference	between	
what	we	referred	to	as	self	and	ego.	This	separation	allowed	for	clearer	analyses	and	
resolutions	 concerning	 references	 to	 the	 nafs	 and	 critically	 review	 associations	
linked	to	 it.	Moreover,	we	drew	more	examinations	to	 identify	 the	anatomy	of	 the	
ego	 and	 emphasize	 its	 main	 components,	 which	 are	 the	 potencies	 of	 anger	 and	
temptation.		
 
How	is	Kibar	al-Nafs	a	Virtue?	
We	addressed	the	possible	tension	from	al-Ghazālī	and	Miskawayh’s	accounts	on	
agreeing	that	kibar	al-nafs	is	a	virtue,	while	holding	on	the	view	that	one	should	get	
rid	of	their	nafs	to	reach	virtue,	not	grow	it.	The	presented	solution	was	to	look	at	it	
with	al-Ghazālī’s	distinction	of	the	nafs	as	to	understand	that	‘greatness	of	the	nafs”	
is	referred	to	the	‘self’,	that	is	good,	not	the	‘ego’,	that	is	evil.	
 
The	Selfish	and	Selfless	Reality	in	Sufism	Morality		
We	elaborated	that	all	human	actions	necessarily	require	an	interest	on	the	‘self’.	
Hence,	nothing	is	moral	or	immoral	about	this	ontological	notion,	which	is	that	hu-
mans	 are	 always	 in	 need	 since	 their	 ‘needy’	 and	 ‘imperfect’	nature.	 If	 the	 interest	
feeds	the	ego,	then	we	could	refer	to	this	as	‘selfish’,	and	this	is	immoral.	On	the	oth-
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er	hand,	if	the	interest	feeds	the	self	then	this	is	moral	because	this	is	what	humans	
were	created	for,	and	this	will	lead	the	person	closer	to	God.		
 
Worship	by	Fear,	Desire,	and	Love	
We	also	highlighted	the	three	different	motivations	for	worship	suggested	by	Al	
Karkhi.	Two	of	them	are	considered	to	be	void	of	morality	for	Sufis,	yet	are	valid	in	
the	Islamic	shari’a,	those	are	the	ones	of	fear	of	God’s	punishment	and	seeking	God’s	
reward.	We	 could	 realize	 that	 they	 are	 valid	within	 the	 Islamic	 shari’a	 given	 that	
these	two	motivations	are	 feeding	 the	 ‘self’,	 since	 the	way	to	actualize	 the	ends	of	
these	motivations	would	 still	 require	 the	discipline	of	 the	ego	and	would	not	 feed	
the	ego.	It	could	be	also	realized	that	although	these	two	motivations	would	not	feed	
the	ego,	which	is	why	they	are	considered	to	be	moral	according	to	the	Islamic	sha-
ri’a,	yet	these	motivations	will	not	flourish	the	self	to	reach	its	potential	of	reaching	
high	levels	of	knowledge	and	unity	with	the	divine.	The	saints	who	are	able	to	wor-
ship	God,	in	what	the	Sufis	consider	as	 the	moral	motivation	 for	worship,	who	are	
able	to	worship	God	only	for	the	sake	of	Him,	actualize	this	potential	of	the	self.	We	
finally	added	that	it	is	plausible	to	consider	that	the	first	two	motivations	are	appro-
priate	when	one	 is	still	having	their	ego	present,	since	 it	 is	 the	removal	of	the	ego	
that	will	grant	one	the	third	praised	motivation	for	worshipping	God.	
 
Unity	of	the	Nafs	
Inspired	 from	the	account	of	the	unity	of	virtue,	 it	was	appropriate	to	consider	
the	states	of	the	nafs,	as	well	as	the	manifestation	of	the	ego,	in	a	similar	manner.	A	
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person	could	experience	different	states	of	the	nafs	according	to	the	corresponding	
virtue	attained	or	unattained.	The	ego	of	a	person	as	well	could	be	viewed	as	a	col-
lective	account	of	its	manifestation	in	different	parts	of	vices.	
	 	
Slaying	the	Ego,	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	and	Sufi	Virtue	
The	important	relations	between	slaying	the	ego,	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna	and	Sufi	
virtue	were	explored	in	the	thesis.	Slaying	the	ego	is	necessary	but	not	sufficient	to	
reaching	Sufi	virtue.	As	explained,	after	slaying	the	ego,	there	is	an	important	step	of	
adorning	 the	 traits	 of	God,	which	will	 lead	 to	 Sufi	 virtue.	Nonetheless,	 slaying	 the	
ego	is	necessary	and	sufficient	to	reaching	al-nafs	al-muṭma’inna.	
 
Slaying	the	Ego	is	the	Moderation	of	Potencies		
As	being	one	of	the	primary	arguments	and	contributions	presented	in	the	the-
sis,	this	claim	describes	since	the	ego	is	manifested	due	to	the	lack	of	moderation	of	
anger	 and	 temptation	 potencies,	 therefore	 the	 way	 to	 slay	 the	 ego	 is	 to	 achieve	
moderation,	not	 elimination,	 to	 the	 potencies	 of	 anger	 and	 temptation	 (SA,	 p.	 80).	
Only	 then,	 these	 potencies	 will	 transform	 to	 virtues	 of	 courage	 and	 temperance,	
which	are	two	of	four	cardinal	virtues	that	are	the	roots	of	all	good	morals.	The	com-
ing	section	is	complementary	to	this	part	as	to	understand	how	to	reach	the	slaying	
of	the	whole	ego.	
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Potency	and	Core	Vices:	Between	Moderation	and	Purification		
What	 I	 consider	 as	 another	 prime	 contribution	 for	 this	work,	 this	 explanation	
expanded	our	understanding	of	 the	view	of	morality	 in	Sufism	by	bringing	 critical	
analysis	to	the	view	of	the	main	vices.	We	explained	that	there	are	vices	of	the	ego,	
which	we	called	potency	vices,	where	the	principle	of	golden	mean	could	be	applied,	
which	means	that	moderation	is	the	way	to	obtain	virtue	in	this	case.	As	for	the	vices	
of	the	heart,	we	called	them	core	vices.	Moderation	is	not	applicable	in	this	case,	but	
purification	 is.	Each	of	 these	core	vices	needs	to	be	 ‘removed’	and	eliminated,	and	
have	the	heart	purified	from.	It	was	suggested	that	even	if	the	ego	could	be	a	main	
factor	of	‘contaminating’	the	heart,	yet	the	ego	could	also	be	symptomatic	to	the	ill-
ness	of	the	heart.	The	core	vices	are	the	underlying,	rooted,	and	hidden	vices	that	need	
removal,	along	with	the	moderation	of	the	potencies,	for	the	slaying	of	the	ego.		
 
Commonalities	Between	VE	and	Sufism	
In	many	 parts	 of	 the	 thesis,	 especially	 through	 the	 part	 that	was	 dedicated	 to	
specify	these	points,	the	relations	between	VE	and	Sufism	were	made	clear.	The	are-
as	of	differences	were	also	identified.		
 
A	Conceptual	Model	of	the	Five	Human	Elements	
A	model	was	 illustrated	 that	 attempted	 to	 conceptualize	 the	relations	between	
the	nafs	and	the	other	human	parts:	heart,	soul,	intellect,	and	body.	The	illustration	
included	the	links	that	were	mentioned	throughout	this	work	between	the	nafs	and	
some	of	 these	parts,	as	well	as	suggested	new	ones	mainly	related	to	the	 intellect,	
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which	was	sort	of	the	least	mentioned	part	among	the	five.	This	model	could	hope-
fully	bring	a	new	and	clearer	insight	for	understanding	the	relations	between	these	
five	elements	in	the	light	of	the	three	different	versions	of	the	states	of	the	self.	
	
Answering	the	Research	Question	
The	thesis’	main	objective	was	to	argue	that	Sufism	not	only	assumes	relations	to	
the	tradition	of	virtue	ethics,	but	also	offers	more	accounts	especially	on	the	nafs,	its	
virtues	and	vices.	It	was	shown	how	the	Sufi	literature	is	rich,	and	provides	unique	
and	critical	 accounts	 on	 the	 character	and	morality.	The	harmonies	between	 both	
traditions	were	shown	as	well	as	part	of	the	wider	paradigm	that	Sufism	holds	re-
garding	the	nature	and	truth	of	the	self	and	morality.	
 
Future	Work		
I	consider	this	work	to	be	an	initiation	of	a	bigger	project	that	could	build	new	
routes	from	authentic	traditions	of	virtue	ethics	and	Sufism	in	particular,	all	the	way	
to	our	modern	view	of	the	self.	This	philosophical	investigation	could	help	us	better	
understand	the	ontological	and	psychological	nature	of	the	human	self,	which	might	
fulfill	a	need	for	“a	coherent	etiological	theory”	that	is	still	missing	when	it	comes	to	
dealing	with	anxiety	disorders,	which	is	considered	to	be	the	most	common	psycho-
logical	disorder	mental	health	professionals	deal	with	(Alladin,	2015,	p.	1).	Although	
this	paper	was	 concerned	with	 theoretical	 critical	 examinations	 of	 the	 self	 from	 a	
focused	angle,	more	theoretical	 inquiries	 could	be	explored	 like	 relations	between	
aesthetics	and	morality,	morality	and	wellbeing,	as	well	as	more	accounts	on	the	self	
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from	different	scholars	and	philosophers	of	both	traditions.	Furthermore,	this	work	
could	inspire	empirical	efforts	and	studies	that	could	assess	the	practicality	of	these	
theoretical	 findings,	 which	 can	 hopefully	 offer	 valuable	 insights	 and	 solutions	 for	
better	understanding	the	human	self,	and	help	it	fulfill	its	potential	and	reach	possi-
ble	ways	to	serenity.	
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